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PROBABILITY, CONFIDENCE, AND MATSUSHITA: 





This article offers a reinterpretation of the Supreme Court’s 
seminal decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corporation. Although Matsushita is often credited with 
ushering in a new era of summary judgment by shifting power from 
the jury to trial court judges, this conclusion is based on an 
erroneous understanding of the case. In reality, Matsushita is a 
narrow decision that does not alter the relationship between judge 
and jury. Appreciating the true import of Matsushita is possible 
only by delineating between the concepts of probability and 
confidence. The Supreme Court’s decision in Matsushita is usually 
understood as having been decided according to a probability 
analysis, but the best interpretation of the case is that it was 
decided pursuant to a confidence analysis. Recognizing the true 
basis of the Matsushita decision dispels the popular belief that 
Matsushita requires an aggressive use of summary judgment by 
trial judges.  In addition, properly understanding Matsushita is the 
key to comprehending the pleading requirement of “plausibility,” 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In my article Probability, Confidence, and the Reasonable Jury 
Standard,1 I explore the difference between the concepts of 
probability and confidence as they pertain to disputed questions of 
fact in litigation. Stated simply, the concept of probability requires 
an estimate as to the likelihood of a given fact being true; the 
confidence inquiry asks how sure one is in the accuracy of that 
probability estimate. Generally speaking, the more evidence one 
has regarding an unknown fact the more confident one can be in a 
probability estimate of that given fact. In the Reasonable Jury 
article, I explain that a judge can use either a probability analysis 
or a confidence analysis to dispose of a suit through summary 
judgment.  I also explain why the legal profession has, for the most 
part, failed to distinguish between these separate theories of 
summary judgment. I conclude that this failure can be primarily 
attributed to the Supreme Court’s gloss on the language of Rule 56 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This judicial gloss—the 
reasonable jury standard2—obscures the distinction between 
confidence and probability at the summary judgment stage.3 
This article builds on the foundation established in the 
Reasonable Jury article by demonstrating the importance of 
separating the concepts of probability and confidence.  More 
specifically, this article will focus on the incorrect—and 
unfortunate—interpretation assigned to the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in the infamous antitrust case of Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corporation.4  
The Matsushita decision is one of the Supreme Court’s most 
frequently cited cases.5 Along with the other 1986 “trilogy” 
cases—Anderson v. Liberty Lobby6 and Celotox Corp. v. 
                                                
1 Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence and the Reasonable Jury Standard, 
84 MISS. L.J. (2015) (forthcoming). 
2 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). 
3 See id. at 255–56; see also Meier, supra note 1. 
4 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
5 See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 
1357 (2010) (listing Matsushita as the third-most cited Supreme Court case by 
federal courts and tribunals). 
6 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242. 
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Catrett7—the Matsushita opinion is often credited for ushering in a 
new era of summary judgment. 8 In this new era, trial court judges 
are to aggressively “screen” cases to prevent “unworthy” cases 
from proceeding to the jury for a full-blown trial.9 The Matsushita 
opinion, in particular, is thought to support this modern approach 
to summary judgment.10 In Matsushita, the Supreme Court upheld 
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant despite a vigorous dispute by the plaintiffs and 
defendants regarding the material facts of the litigation.11 Thus, 
more so than the Anderson and Celotex cases—which both rested 
                                                
7 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
8 See, e.g., Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Managing Summary 
Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 517, 517 (2012) (“Conventional wisdom long 
held that the Trilogy caused a fundamental shift in pretrial practice by leading 
lawyers to be more aggressive in seeking summary judgment and by leading 
judges to be more willing to grant it.”); Bradley Scott Shannon, I Have Federal 
Pleading All Figured Out, 61 CASE WEST. L. REV. 453, 455 (2010) (stating that 
this trilogy of Supreme Court cases “invigorated summary judgment practice”); 
William V. Dorsaneo, III, Reexamining the Right to Trial by Jury, 54 SMU L. 
REV. 1695, 1712 (2001) (“The Supreme Court’s invigoration of federal 
summary judgment practice occurred in the 1985 term when the Court decided a 
trilogy of cases . . . .”). 
9 See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 987, 994 (2003) (“In a series of cases in 1986, the Supreme Court sent a 
clear signal to the lower courts that summary judgment could be relied upon to 
weed out frivolous lawsuits and avoid wasteful trials.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1897, 1913 (1998) (concluding that the trilogy cases “promoted summary 
judgment from a housekeeping device for picking up obviously unworthy cases 
to a major option to be encouraged, or even pushed, in all kinds of disputes, 
large and small, even in some involving factual controversies”).  
10 See, e.g., James Joseph Duane, The Four Greatest Myths About Summary 
Judgment, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1523, 1568 (1995) (stating that Matsushita 
is a “major landmark in summary judgment jurisprudence” despite efforts by 
commentators to limit the case); but see Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment 
and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1329, 1348 (2005) (“Celotex most clearly altered well-established summary 
judgment practice, and in any event, Celotex, far more than the others [in the 
trilogy], decisively opened the eyes of the federal courts to the propriety of 
summary judgment in certain cases . . . .”). 
11 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
595–98. 
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on technical legal questions12—Matsushita has been cited as the 
lynchpin13 of the modern trend in which summary judgment is 
used more aggressively by the trial court judge to take issues away 
from the jury.14 Pursuant to this understanding of the case, the 
                                                
12 See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“[W]e find no express or implied 
requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits 
or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.”); Adam Steinman, 
The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens 
Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 94 (2006) 
(“Anderson raised the narrow issue of the property approach to summary 
judgment motions when the dispositive issue is subject to a heighted standard of 
proof.”). 
13 See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Antitrust Summary Judgment and the Quick 
Look Approach, 62 SMU L. REV. 493, 510 (2009) (“Matsushita . . . created a 
modern and dynamic summary judgment mechanism.”).  Because of the 
profound effect on summary judgment that Matsushita has had, it is still studied 
and debated in a way that Anderson and Celotex are not.  See, e.g., Spencer 
Waller Weber, Matsushita at Twenty: A Conference Introduction, 38 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 399, 399–400  (2007) (explaining why the Matsushita case was 
selected as a symposium topic). 
14 See, e.g., Joe Sims & Philip A. Proger, Litigation Issues in Dealer 
Termination Pricing Cases, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 465, 466 (1991) (“Matsushita 
seem[s] to encourage courts to use summary judgment more aggressively .  . . 
where the prevailing view had been that summary judgment should be used 
sparingly given the inherently circumstantial nature of much of the proof.”).  
Although all commentators agree that federal jury trials are vanishing, they 
disagree as to whether the “modern” approach to summary judgment, as shaped 
by the 1986 trilogy, is responsible for this trend. Compare Martin H. Redish, 
Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation 
Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1332–35 (2005) (discussing the empirical 
studies documenting the decrease in federal civil jury trials and concluding that 
“common sense” suggests that the Court’s decision in Matsushita (as well as 
Celotex and Anderson) is at least partly responsible for this trend), with Linda S. 
Mullenix, The 25th Anniversary of the Summary Judgment Trilogy: Much Ado 
About Very Little, LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 561, 561 (2012) (remarking that “numerous 
empirical studies have shown [that] the summary judgment trilogy has had scant 
impact on judicial reception to enhanced utilization of summary judgment as a 
means to streamline litigation”).  I consider myself as an adherent of the 
“common sense” view urged by Professor Redish; even if it is difficult to 
empirically demonstrate a cause-and-effect relationship between the 1986 
trilogy cases and the subsequent decline in jury trials, this does not mean that no 
such relationship exists.  See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, Summary Judgment: 
What We Think We Know Verses What We Ought to Know, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Matsushita signaled to lower court 
judges: Avoid the costs and expense of trial if the evidentiary 
record leans towards one party’s version of the material facts in 
dispute.15 
But there has always been some uneasiness regarding this 
conventional understanding, and use, of Matsushita. Some 
commentators and courts have insisted that Matsushita was a 
unique case that should be limited to the antitrust context.16 There 
is ample support within the Matsushita opinion for this view; 
various portions of the opinion reference factors unique to antitrust 
                                                
705, 719 (2012) (“[T]hese numbers do not tell us how many potential plaintiffs 
chose not to file their claims because of the chilling effect of the trilogy and 
increased use of summary judgment.”). 
15 See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: 
A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court’s New Approach to Summary 
Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 42 (1988) (quoting a federal judge, in open 
court on a motion for summary judgment, as saying that “the Supreme Court has 
told us [in the trilogy cases] to make wider use of summary judgment to 
eliminate cases”). 
16 See, e.g., In re Dana Corp, 574 F.3d 129, 158 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that 
it had “considerable difficulty with the bankruptcy court’s [] reliance on 
Matsushita” because the case before the court did not involve antitrust 
litigation); White v. Cmty Care, Inc., No. CIV.A.07-1507, 2008 WL 5216569, at 
*15 n.16 (W.D. Pa. 2008 Dec. 11, 2008) (saying that Matsushita was “factually 
distinguishable” from the civil rights case before the court); Edward Brunet, 
Antitrust Summary Judgment and the Quick Look Approach, 62 SMU L. REV. 
493, 510–11 (2009) (acknowledging that there were transsubstantive portions of 
the Matsushita opinion, such as the rejection of the former “slightest doubt” 
interpretation of Rule 56 in favor of the reasonable jury standard used for 
directed verdicts, but also explaining that the portion of the opinion in which the 
Court considered whether the plaintiffs’ evidence was plausible “only makes 
sense if characterized as a matter of substantive antitrust law”); Arthur R. Miller, 
The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability 
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1044–68 (2003) (concluding that 
Matsushita “seems specific to the antitrust context”); William W. Schwarzer & 
Alan Hirsch, Summary Judgment After Eastman Kodak, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 6–
7 (1993) (concluding that Matsushita “rests on a specific point of antitrust law”); 
Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33 
SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 628 (2003) (“Matsushita may be an artifact of 
antitrust law . . . .”).  
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law.17 This more limited view of Matsushita, however, undermines 
the broad principles the case is used to support. If the Matsushita 
decision was the result of factors unique to the antitrust context, 
the case cannot justify the broader, seismic shifts that have 
occurred within summary judgment law in the past twenty-five 
years. 
In addition, viewing Matsushita as a unique product of antitrust 
law seems inconsistent with the transsubstantive nature of Rule 56 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is beyond dispute that 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted with the view 
that the principles and approaches contained therein could be 
applied even-handedly to cases involving all different types of 
substantive law.18 If Matsushita was truly the byproduct of the 
antitrust setting of the case, there has yet to be a credible 
explanation as to how this conclusion is consistent with the 
transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules. 
Thus, a stalemate has developed regarding the appropriate 
understanding of Matsushita.  Many commentators and lower 
courts continue to cite Matsushita outside of the antitrust context.19 
Under this view, Matsushita is an extremely important case 
because it requires a reorientation of the respective roles of trial 
court judge and jury regarding the resolution of facts.  The 
transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules, including Rule 56, 
supports this understanding of Matsushita. In addition, the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent characterization of Matsushita as not 
“introduc[ing] a special burden on plaintiffs facing summary 
                                                
17 See infra notes 116–22 and accompanying text. 
18 See Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: 
An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 
377, 383 (2010) (“It was almost inevitable that the Advisory Committee would 
draft transsubstantive rules . . . .”). 
19 See, e.g., Smith v. Boyer, 2012 WL 2116502, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jun 11, 
2012) (citing Matsushita in a civil rights case); United States v. Degayner, 2008 
WL 4613084 (M.D. Fla. Oct 16, 2008) (citing Matsushita in a False Claims Act 
case); Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 261, 338 (2010) (“[Matsushita] is frequently taught in civil procedure 
classes as a summary judgment case, not an antitrust case.”); Miller, supra note 
16, at 1068–69 nn.456–63 (listing older cases applying Matsushita outside of the 
antitrust context). 
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judgment in antitrust cases”20 arguably lends support to the view 
that Matsushita is a broadly applicable opinion whose import is not 
limited to the antitrust context. Other commentators and courts 
continue to insist, however, that Matsushita was a product of 
forces unique to the antitrust context;21 the language of the 
Matsushita opinion strongly supports this view. 
The stalemate that has developed has not been resolved 
because the proponents of each of these differing views have failed 
to adequately address fundamental problems regarding their 
respective positions. Thus, those who broadly interpret Matsushita 
as changing the respective roles of judge and jury have failed to 
explain the portions of the opinion that emphasize the case’s 
antitrust context.22 On the other hand, those who view Matsushita 
as unique to antitrust law have failed to reconcile the Court’s 
emphasis on antitrust-unique factors with the transsubstantive 
nature of the Federal Rules.23 
This stalemate will continue so long as Matsushita is 
understood as having been decided pursuant to a probability 
analysis. According to the current, conventional wisdom regarding 
Matsushita, the Court’s decision to affirm summary judgment for 
the defendants revolved around the question as to whether the 
defendants had, in fact, engaged in the illegal agreement alleged by 
the plaintiffs.24 This conventional wisdom regarding Matsushita 
                                                
20 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 468 (1992). 
21 Risinger, supra note 15, at 42. 
22 See, e.g., Duane, supra note 10, at 1554–95 (proposing a broad 
interpretation of Matsushita but never accounting for the antitrust-specific 
language in the opinion). 
23 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 16, at 1029–34 (concluding that the antitrust 
context of Matsushita was important to the Court’s conclusion but not 
reconciling this view with the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure). 
24 See, e.g., Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Summary Judgment in Rhode Island: 
Is It Time to Wrap the Mantra in Celotex?, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 153, 
170 (1997) (“[Matsushita] gave to federal trial judges the authority, if not the 
mandate, to review even the most complex evidence and then make a 
determination as to whether the evidence could support reasonable inferences by 
a fact finder regarding the material prongs of the burden imposed by the 
substantive law on the party seeking to have the favorable inferences drawn.”). 
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finds support in various portions of the Court’s opinion.25  
This stalemate will not be resolved as long as the case 
continues to be understood from a probability perspective.  If, 
however, Matsushita is viewed according to a confidence analysis, 
the internal inconsistencies that arise under the probability 
understanding of the case are resolved. Under a confidence reading 
of Matsushita, the Supreme Court did not base its decision on 
whether the illegal antitrust agreement the plaintiffs alleged had, in 
fact, occurred. Instead, what the Court decided was that there was 
so little evidence on this point that any conclusion as to the 
probability of the existence of the agreement would necessarily 
involve an unacceptable margin of error, thus requiring that 
summary judgment be entered against the plaintiff. Under a 
confidence analysis, a court determines the acceptable “margin of 
error” or level of confidence that will be required in a particular 
case.26 This purely legal analysis compels a court to consider the 
consequences of allowing a jury to make a probability 
determination on a scant record. This analysis can be informed by 
factors unique to the substantive law involved in a particular 
dispute.  
Thus, if Matsushita was decided according to a confidence 
analysis, the Court quite sensibly considered that an erroneous 
conclusion regarding the factual dispute in Matsushita could result 
in debilitating consequences for businesses engaged in perfectly 
legal—and economically desirable—conduct. Under this view, 
because of the particular antitrust costs associated with an 
erroneous factual conclusion, the Court in Matsushita required 
additional evidence before the case could reach the jury. By 
requiring that more evidence be assembled before the case is 
submitted to a jury, the margin of error associated with any jury 
conclusion decreases and a sufficient degree of confidence can be 
had in the conclusion actually reached by the jury. 
A confidence interpretation of Matsushita can thus explain why 
the Court’s opinion emphasized factors unique to antitrust law. 
Moreover, if Matsushita was decided according to a confidence 
analysis, the Court’s reliance on factors unique to antitrust law is 
                                                
25 See infra notes 111–21 and accompanying text. 
26 See Meier, supra note 1. 
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fully consonant with the transsubstantive approach of the Federal 
Rules. A confidence analysis is transsubstantive in the sense that a 
trial judge must always be satisfied that there is a sufficient amount 
of evidence in the case to satisfy the confidence threshold. That 
said, the application of this transsubstantive standard may require a 
judge setting this confidence threshold to consider the subject 
matter of the litigation. In this sense, a confidence analysis is 
similar to the pleading standard set out in Federal Rule 8. Both 
standards are transsubstantive, but applying them in a particular 
case requires consideration of the substantive law at stake.  
A confidence understanding of Matsushita can thus resolve the 
current stalemate regarding this infamous case by explaining the 
Court’s antitrust-specific language in a way that is consistent with 
the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules. The Matsushita 
opinion, carefully considered with a little bit of effort, supports the 
view that the Court’s decision was actually based on a confidence 
inquiry (“Is there a sufficient amount of evidence in the record to 
permit the case to proceed to the jury for a probability analysis?”) 
rather than a probability inquiry (“Does the record evidence 
support the conclusion that an illegal conspiracy did, in fact, 
occur?”). Given that the language of Matsushita is consistent with 
a confidence analysis, and considering that this reading of the case 
resolves the current stalemate regarding the appropriate 
interpretation of that case, the confidence reading of Matsushita is 
the superior interpretation. 
Resolving the true meaning of Matsushita, over twenty-five 
years after the case was decided, is not simply an academic 
exercise. The Matsushita opinion is still used as the basis for the 
modern, zealous use of summary judgment that has eroded the role 
of the jury and warped the distinction between law and fact.27 This 
view, based on a misunderstanding of Matsushita, should be 
rejected. Properly understood, Matsushita is actually a narrow case 
with relatively little importance outside of the antitrust context. 
In addition, a correct interpretation of Matsushita is the key to 
understanding the “plausibility” pleading standard that the 
                                                
27 See, e,g., Superior Offshore Int’l., Inc. v. Bristow Grp., Inc., No. 11-
30102012 WL 3055849, at *3 (3d Cir. July 22, 2012) (citing Matsushita and 
stating that a court “need not turn a blind eye to the weight of the evidence”). 
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Supreme Court recently introduced in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly.28 
In Twombly, the Supreme Court determined that a plaintiff’s 
complaint must assert a claim that is “plausible” to the district 
court judge.29 Most commentators have interpreted the 
“plausibility” standard to require an analysis of the probable truth 
of the plaintiff’s allegations.30 If the Matsushita defendant was 
entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff did not have 
enough evidence, it is relatively easy to see why the Court believed 
that the Twombly defendant was entitled to a dismissal at the 
pleadings stage: even if everything alleged in the Twombly 
complaint was true, this circumstantial evidence would not 
constitute a sufficient amount of evidence to enable the plaintiff to 
get to a jury. Thus, Twombly—like Matsushita—did not involve an 
invasion into the fact-finding terrain of the jury. Most 
commentators interpret Twombly in this light,31 and have rightly 
criticized the notion that a trial court judge should determine the 
                                                
28 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
29 See id. at 556–57. 
30 See, e.g., Henry S. Noyes, The Rise of the Common Law of Federal 
Pleading:  Iqbal, Twombly, and the Application of Judicial Experience, 56 
VILL. L. REV. 857, 859 (2012) (stating that the plausibility standard “requires a 
district court to refer to objective information, albeit extraneous to the 
complaint, to inform itself of the “truth” of the factual picture painted by the 
plaintiff in the complaint.”); Rory Bahadur, The Scientific Impossibility of 
Plausibility, 90 NEB. L. REV. 435, 456–57 (2011) (“The Court’s use of the term 
“possibility,” however, belies the assertion that plausibility is not a probability 
analysis because possibility is an expression of probability.”); Suzette 
Malveaux, Front Loading And Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery 
Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 65, 83–84, 85 (2010) (concluding that the plausibility test 
requires a probability analysis); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to 
Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 
26 (2010) (stating that the plausibility analysis depends “on the relative 
likelihood that legally actionable conduct occurred versus a hypothesized 
innocent explanation.”); Marc I. Steinberg & Diego E. Gomez-Cornejo, 
Blurring the Lines Between Pleading Doctrines: The Enhanced Rule 8(A)(2) 
Plausibility Pleading Standard Converges With the Heightened Pleading 
Standards Under Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA, 30 REV. OF LITIG. 1, 26 (2010) 
(describing Twombly’s plausibility standard as a “tacit probability” 
requirement). 
31 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.  
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inferential value of circumstantial evidence, a function historically 
reserved to the jury.32 Instead, Twombly and Matsushita—properly 
interpreted—simply involved instances in which the court 
concluded, as a matter of law, that either the record evidence or the 
factual allegations, even if proven true, would not constitute an 
adequate amount of information from which the jury could resolve 
the disputed question of fact. 
This article will slowly build toward the conclusion that 
Matsushita has been incorrectly interpreted as a case involving 
probability rather than confidence. In Section II, I will begin by 
quickly examining the infamous blue bus and gatecrasher 
hypotheticals first posed by Professors Laurence Tribe and 
Jonathon Cohen, respectively. Each of these hypotheticals presents 
a similar paradox: How can a district court judge resolve a case in 
favor of a defendant, before a jury trial, when the scant evidence 
available suggests that the plaintiff’s version of a disputed, 
material fact to the litigation is—more likely than not—true? This 
“paradox” can only be resolved by carefully distinguishing 
between the concepts of confidence and probability. As such, the 
blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals serve as an excellent 
starting point for identifying and distinguishing between the 
concepts of confidence and probability in the litigation context. 
This section will briefly introduce the concepts of probability and 
confidence and demonstrate how the “paradox” of the blue bus and 
gatecrasher hypotheticals can only be resolved with an 
appreciation for how these two concepts are distinct. 
Section III of this Article segues from the hypothetical, 
controlled context of the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals to 
the actual cases discussed in Sections IV and V. To facilitate this 
                                                
32 See Bahadur, supra note 30, at 456 (“If plausibility were akin to a 
probability requirement, plausibility would be abhorrent to the constitutionally 
based division of labor in the federal court system because the judge, rather than 
the jury, would be answering the question of whether or not the allegations in 
the complaint are more likely accurate than not.”); Darrell A.H. Miller, Iqbal 
and Empathy, 78 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1005–06 (2010) (“It is unsurprising that 
Iqbal and Twombly both strenuously deny that they impose a ‘probability’ 
requirement at the pleading stage. Probability—at least in the civil context—is 
typically understood as the province of the jury. Probability pleading would 
have been a true sea change in the division between judge and jury.”). 
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transition, I will dispel the notion that the confidence principle is 
only important to litigation involving the type of overt statistical 
evidence such as that involved in the blue bus and gatecrashers 
hypotheticals. In reality, the confidence principle can be triggered 
even when the scant record evidence does not involve the type of 
overt statistical evidence present in those hypotheticals. The 
statistical evidence involved in the blue bus and gatecrasher 
hypotheticals made explicit the import of the confidence principle, 
but the confidence principle has wider applicability than the 
controlled settings of those cases. 
In Section IV, I will proceed to a discussion of Houchens v. 
American Home Assurance Co.33 The Houchens case provides a 
nice transition to Matsushita because it involves a clear application 
of the confidence principle in the context of an actual case. The 
Houchens court, however, failed to articulate that the justification 
for summary judgment in that case was confidence rather than 
probability. Instead, the court fell into the common trap of relying 
upon the oft-quoted “equal inferences rule” as an explanation for 
its decision. In this sense, Houchens is representative of a large 
number of cases that come close to explicitly identifying the 
confidence principle but instead bungle the explanation. 
In Section V, I will examine the Matsushita opinion in light of 
the distinction between probability and confidence. The Matsushita 
case, compared to the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals and 
the Houchens case, is not as obviously based on a confidence 
analysis. An understanding of the opinion as deriving from 
confidence principles thus requires some care and attention. This 
section will ultimately demonstrate that Matsushita was based on a 
confidence, rather than a probability, analysis. In doing so, the 
benefits of this “reinterpretation” of Matsushita will also be 
explored. 
 
II. BLUE BUSES, GATECRASHERS, AND CONFIDENCE 
 
The first articulation of the confidence concept was the result 
of efforts to explain two famous legal hypotheticals: the “blue bus” 
and “gatecrasher” hypotheticals. Professor L. Jonathan Cohen first 
                                                
33 927 F.2d 163 (4th Cir. 1991). 
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posed the famous gatecrasher hypothetical in his book The 
Probable and the Provable: 
Consider, for example, a case in which it is 
common ground that 499 people paid for admission 
to a rodeo, and that 1,000 are counted on the seats, 
of whom A is one. Suppose no tickets were issued 
and there can be no testimony as to whether A paid 
for admission or climbed over the fence. So by any 
plausible criterion of mathematical probability there 
is a .501 probability, on the admitted facts, that he 
did not pay. The mathematicist theory would 
apparently imply that in such circumstances the 
rodeo organizers are entitled to judgment against A 
for the admission-money, since the balance of 
probability (and also the difference between prior 
and posterior probabilities) would lie in their 
favour. But it seems manifestly unjust that A should 
lose his case when there is an agreed mathematical 
probability of as high as .499 that he in fact paid for 
admission. 
Indeed, if the organizers were really entitled to 
judgment against A, they would presumably be 
equally entitled to judgment against each person in 
the same situation as A. So they might conceivably 
be entitled to recover 1,000 admission-moneys, 
when it was admitted that 499 had actually been 
paid. The absurd injustice of this suffices to show 
that there is something wrong somewhere. But 
where?34 
The “gatecrasher” hypothetical is rivaled in fame (or infamy) 
by Professor Laurence Tribe’s35 “blue bus” hypothetical. Professor 
                                                
34 L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 75 (1977). 
35 According to Professor Tribe, he did not invent this hypothetical.  See 
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal 
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1341 n. 37 (1971) (calling the blue bus 
hypothetical a “famous chestnut”).  Nevertheless, the origin of this hypothetical 
is generally attributed to Professor Tribe.  See Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel 
Shaviro, Veridal Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of 
Overtly  Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247, 257 
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Tribe’s original hypothetical is rather straightforward and simple: 
Consider next the cases in which the identity of the 
responsible agent is in doubt. Plaintiff is negligently 
run down by a blue bus. The question is whether the 
bus belonged to the defendant. Plaintiff is prepared 
to prove that defendant operates four-fifths of all the 
blue buses in town. What effect, if any, should such 
proof be given?36 
Each of these hypotheticals presents a “paradox.” Almost all 
commentators who have considered these hypotheticals presume 
that each case would result in a court-ordered judgment for the 
defendant, before the case even reached the jury.37 The paradox is 
that the only available evidence on the disputed question of fact in 
each hypothetical (“Did A pay for admission to the rodeo?” and 
“Was plaintiff injured by defendant’s bus?”) requires a conclusion 
that the fact needed for the plaintiff’s recovery is, more likely than 
not, true. If anything, it seems as if the evidence would support a 
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff rather than the 
defendant: the best guess as to what actually happened clearly 
supports the plaintiff’s factual “story” (“A is a gatecrasher” and “It 
was defendant’s bus”) rather than the defendant’s “story” (“I am 
not a gatecrasher” and “It was not our bus”). And, even more, there 
can be no reasonable disagreement that the best guess as to 
probability in each of these hypotheticals favors the plaintiff; the 
beauty of these hypotheticals is that they eliminate any doubt as to 
the probability of the material fact from the limited record 
available. 
The paradox of the gatecrasher and blue bus hypotheticals can 
only be resolved by carefully distinguishing the concepts of 
probability and confidence, an insight that Professor Neil Cohen 
first recognized in his article Confidence in Probability38 and 
                                                
(1990) (attributing the blue bus hypothetical to Professor Tribe). 
36 See Tribe, supra note 35, at 1340–41. 
37 See Meier, supra note 1, at n.98 
38 Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a 
World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1985).  Even though 
Professor Cohen essentially resolved the “paradox” of the blue bus and 
gatecrasher hypotheticals decades ago, his maneuver in distinguishing between 
probability and confidence has not been often replicated in the context of federal 
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explored in depth in my article Confidence, Probability, and the 
Reasonable Jury Standard.39 A cursory explanation of the 
confidence principle should suffice for the purposes of this article; 
those seeking a full discussion of the concept can find one in my 
Reasonable Jury article. The reason that the defendant is entitled to 
summary judgment in the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals is 
that there is not a sufficient amount of evidence such that there can 
be a requisite level of confidence as to any probability assessment 
from that evidence. In the gatecrasher and blue bus hypotheticals, a 
probability assessment from the available evidence favors the 
plaintiff, a conclusion that the statistical nature of the available 
evidence makes clear. Because the record evidence in the blue bus 
and gatecrasher hypotheticals is so scarce, however, the probability 
assessment necessarily involves a high “margin of error.” Even 
though the probability conclusion compelled by statistical evidence 
in the hypotheticals favors the plaintiff, there can be very little 
confidence in the ultimate validity of this probability assessment. If 
more evidence became available, it might dramatically alter the 
probability of the disputed question of fact.40  
Allowing the plaintiff to recover under the facts of the blue bus 
and gatecrasher hypotheticals is akin to asking a meteorologist to 
predict the chance of rain tomorrow based only on the weather for 
that same day in the previous year. We might prefer the 
meteorologist not make any prediction at all in this situation, 
particularly if people are inclined to place too much reliance on the 
meteorologist’s prediction and make decisions accordingly. The 
same concept applies to disputed questions of fact in the litigation 
                                                
civil procedure.  As I explain in Probability, Confidence, and the Reasonable 
Jury Standard, much of the blame for the absence of a widespread incorporation 
of Cohen’s insights should be attributed to the “reasonable jury” interpretation 
of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which makes the delineation 
of the probability and confidence principles very difficult.  See Meier, supra 
note 1.  Another factor working against the full-scale adoption and incorporation 
of Professor Cohen’s insights regarding probability and confidence is the 
erroneous belief that the confidence principle is triggered only by the presence 
of precise, statistical evidence such as that involved in the blue bus and 
gatecrasher hypotheticals.  This issue is discussed in Section III of this Article. 
39 Meier, supra note 1.  
40 See id.  
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context and explains why commentators generally agree that the 
defendant in each hypothetical should prevail, as a matter of law, 
before the case even reaches the jury. Without sufficient 
information, there can be little confidence in any probability 
conclusion; in these situations, we prefer that the jury (or judge) 
not be permitted to even draw a probability conclusion from the 
scant record. 
Thus, the blue bus and gatecrashers do not, in reality, present a 
paradox. The paradox only exists if one presumes that the 
summary judgment record is analyzed by a judge solely from the 
perspective of probability. But this is not what occurs. A judge, in 
determining whether to permit the case to go to a jury so that it can 
engage in a probability assessment, also considers whether there is 
a sufficient amount of evidence such that the legal system, and 
society, can have a sufficient amount of confidence in any 
probability conclusion from that evidence.41 Rather than presenting 
a paradox, the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals precisely 
identify, in a controlled and hypothetical setting, the importance of 
distinguishing between confidence and probability. 
 
III. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
 
Before proceeding to an analysis of how the confidence 
principle can be used to understand actual cases, one limitation of 
the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals must be resolved. 
Professor Tribe introduced the blue bus hypothetical as part of his 
larger theory about the pitfalls of statistical evidence.42 Professor 
                                                
41 On the question of who applies the confidence analysis, I disagree with 
Professor Cohen.  Professor Cohen believes that the confidence analysis is part 
of a jury’s analysis of the burden of persuasion; I believe that the confidence 
analysis is performed solely by a judge.  See Meier, supra note 1.  After all, the 
presumed result of the blue bus and gatecrashers hypotheticals is that the 
plaintiffs’ claims are thrown out before a jury determination.  See id. Thus, the 
principle that explains the “paradox” of these two hypotheticals—the confidence 
analysis—must be performed by a judge rather than a jury if the pre-jury 
disposition of these two hypotheticals is to be justified.  The jury is ill-equipped 
to engage in the types of policy weighing and legal interpretation that will 
determine the requisite amount of confidence—or allowable “margin of error”—
for a particular case.  See id.  
42 See Tribe, supra note 35, at 1360–61 (explaining the “risk that the jury 
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Tribe’s perspective stifled the entire discussion of the blue bus and 
gatecrasher hypotheticals, because there is an almost complete 
absence of efforts to apply the hypotheticals’ lessons to situations 
involving circumstantial evidence, other than statistical evidence.43 
Circumstantial evidence is commonly used in civil litigation in 
federal courts.44 The type of overt statistical evidence used in 
hypotheticals is, however, more rare.45 Thus, the presumption that 
the hypotheticals are concerned only with overt statistical evidence 
has probably contributed to the general failure to apply the lessons 
from the gatecrasher and blue bus hypotheticals to real-world 
cases. In fact, the lessons from the hypotheticals have broad import 
to all cases involving circumstantial evidence, including—but not 
limited to—cases involving the statistical circumstantial evidence 
involved in the hypotheticals. 
To understand this point, it is first necessary to develop a 
working definition of what is meant by the terms circumstantial 
evidence, direct evidence, and statistical evidence. In my article 
Probability, Confidence, and the Reasonable Jury Standard, I 
explore the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence 
in more depth.46 I conclude that “direct evidence is evidence that, 
if credible to the jury, proves the material fact in the litigation”47; 
circumstantial evidence “is evidence that, if believed by the jury, 
does not ‘directly prove’ the material fact to the litigation but 
rather supplies an inference that the material fact occurred.”48  
                                                
will give [statistical evidence] too much weight when undertaking to combine” 
it with other types of evidence). 
43 See Meier, supra note 1. 
44 See generally Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of 
Circumstantial Evidence, 105 MICH. L. REV. 241, 243–63 (2006) (discussing 
how juries undervalue circumstantial evidence and overvalue direct evidence 
while assuming that circumstantial evidence is frequently used in everyday 
litigation). 
45 See Philip Mitchell Woolery, Death Before Comparable Worth: The 
Limited Utility of Comparable Worth Evidence in a Title VII Cause of Action, 51 
MO. L. REV. 811, 830 (1986) (explaining that attorneys will only rarely rely 
exclusively on statistical evidence and will usually bring forward other types of 
evidence, including non-statistical circumstantial evidence). 
46 Meier, supra note 1. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
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To  illustrate  the  difference  between  direct  and 
circumstantial evidence, I use algebraic symbols to clarify the 
additional inference required for circumstantial evidence.  Direct 
evidence comports with the following algebraic relationship:   
Testimony M   Fact M?  In order to deduce Fact M from 
Testimony M (represented by the arrow in the algebraic equation), 
the jury must find Testimony M credible.49  With circumstantial 
evidence, however, there is an additional logical step between the 
adduced evidence and the relevant fact that is disputed in the 
litigation; this can be algebraically depicted as follows:  Testimony 
X    Fact X    Fact M.  Even if the jury believes the witness 
with regard to his or her testimony regarding Fact X, the jury must 
still resolve whether there is a relationship between the existence 
of Fact X and Fact M. 
In Probability, Confidence, and the Reasonable Jury Standard, 
I conclude that a judge has no ability at the summary judgment 
stage to weigh in on the probability of whether the disputed 
questions of fact exist when both parties have submitted direct 
evidence on this point.50 Stated differently, a party with direct 
evidence of a material fact satisfies the probability component of 
the burden of production.51 I believe the same concept applies to 
the issue of confidence. A plaintiff with direct evidence on a 
material fact has satisfied her burden of production under the 
confidence inquiry; in other words, a party who has direct evidence 
on all material facts has “enough” evidence. Both the gatecrasher 
and blue bus hypotheticals, as well as the two real-world cases 
discussed in this section, involve situations in which a plaintiff 
attempted to prove a material fact by circumstantial evidence only. 
Thus, the widely accepted view that a party with direct evidence is 
entitled to a jury trial seems to be true, 52 with regard to both the 
                                                
49 Id. 
50 See id. 
51 Id. I discuss the burden of production and the burden of persuasion in 
Probability, Confidence, and the Reasonable Jury Standard.  I define the burden 
of production as the obligation of a party to convince a judge to allow the case to 
proceed to a jury trial, whereas the burden of persuasion is the obligation of a 
party to convince a jury to find for that party.  Id.  
52 See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL., 21B FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE §5122 (2d ed. 2012) (“Where the party relies on direct evidence 
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probability and confidence requirements. 
The academic discussion of the blue bus and gatecrasher 
hypotheticals, however, suggests that only a particular type of 
circumstantial evidence—statistical circumstantial evidence—
implicates the confidence principle.53 There is no logical reason, 
however, to limit the confidence principle to cases involving overt, 
statistical evidence. 
According to the model of circumstantial evidence developed 
above, circumstantial evidence follows a pattern in which 
testimony is used in an to attempt to prove a fact which is itself 
probative of a material fact. Thus, circumstantial evidence requires 
the following analytical path: Testimony   Fact X,  Fact X   
Material Fact. Statistical evidence follows this same general 
model.  The only difference is that, with statistical evidence, the 
relationship between Fact X and the Material Fact is 
mathematically determined. Accordingly, testimony establishing 
that 100 people attended the rodeo and that only 49 paid for 
admission (Fact X) statistically resolves the inferential value of 
Fact X to the Material Fact—whether the defendant paid admission 
or crashed the gate. The same basic process is involved with other 
circumstantial evidence that does not involve an explicit statistical 
correlation for the jury but rather requires the jury to consider for 
itself the probative value of the circumstantial evidence to the 
material fact in question.54 
Take, for instance, the relatively famous case of Smith v. Rapid 
Transit,55 which commentators sometimes rely on to support the 
conclusion that the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals would 
end in a court-directed judgment for the defendant. The Smith case, 
                                                
such as the testimony of a witness to the fact in issue, the judge plays a minimal 
role because of the axiom that the credibility of the witness is to be decided by 
the jury. The power of the judge increases, however, when a party relies upon 
circumstantial evidence.”). 
53 See Cohen, supra note 38, at 398 (explaining that probabilities 
determined by a legal fact finder are best thought of estimates). 
54 See Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 35, at 252 (“All evidence is 
probabilistic, in the sense that there is a risk of error in relying on it to support a 
factual conclusion about a case.”). 
55 58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945). 
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which was the basis of the blue bus hypothetical,56 involved a 
dispute in which the plaintiff had been injured by a bus.57 The 
defendant contested the ownership of the bus involved in the 
accident. The plaintiff had presented circumstantial evidence that 
the defendant had the exclusive franchise for operating a bus line 
on the street in which the accident occurred. 58 The lower court 
directed a verdict for the defendant, and the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court affirmed this result.59 In affirming the defendant’s 
directed verdict, the Massachusetts Supreme Court reasoned as 
follows: “The most that can be said of the evidence in the instant 
case is that perhaps the mathematical chances somewhat favor the 
proposition that a bus of the defendant caused the accident.  This 
was not enough.” 60 
Thus, although Smith is similar to the blue bus and gatecrasher 
hypotheticals, it is different because the statistical probability that 
another bus line was involved in the accident on Main Street could 
not be reduced to an exact statistical probability.61 The evidence in 
Smith did not lend itself to a precise determination of the probative 
value of “Fact X” (that the defendant owned the only license to 
operate a bus route on Main Street) to the “Material Fact” 
(ownership of the bus that caused the accident). In order to 
determine the probative value of the circumstantial—but not 
statistical—evidence offered in Smith, more work was necessary.  
Additional questions had to be resolved. In Smith, this might 
require information as to the frequency with which other buses 
traveled down Main Street compared to the frequency with which 
the defendant’s buses operated on Main Street.   
Thus, in a case like Smith involving circumstantial evidence 
that is not statistical evidence, more work is required in order to 
                                                
56 See Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance 
of Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530, 531 (1989) (explaining that the blue bus 
hypothetical is based on the Smith case). 
57 Smith, 58 N.E.2d. at 754–55. 
58 Id. at 755. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. (“The most that can be said of the evidence in the instant case is 
that perhaps the mathematical chances somewhat favor the proposition that a 
bus of the defendant caused the accident.”). 
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determine the probative value of the evidence.  The task of 
accessing this probative value of the evidence is difficult in Smith, 
while in the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals the hard work 
is already done for the jury.62 In both situations, however, the same 
type of reasoning process is required. As Professors Jonathon 
Koehler and Daniel Shaviro have stated, “All evidence is 
probabilistic . . .”63 It is just that the probabilistic nature of 
statistical evidence is more apparent than for it is for “non-
statistical” circumstantial evidence.64 The reason that overt, 
statistical evidence was used in the hypotheticals is simply because 
the “paradox” of these hypotheticals is more easily realized when 
statistical evidence is used. 
Simply because the statistical probability process was made 
more acute in the  hypotheticals, however, is no reason to ignore 
the lessons from those hypotheticals when applying them to the 
more common situation in which the relationship between the 
underlying fact (“Fact X”) and the material fact (“Material Fact”) 
cannot be reduced to a precise statistical relationship. The 
hypotheticals deftly pinpointed a “paradox” that was resolved by 
the confidence principle. The resolution of the paradox, however, 
applies to real-world scenarios in which the paradox is less clearly 
defined due to the absence of statistical evidence.65 In short, the 
problem that the confidence principle resolved is not simply a 
                                                
62 That the inferential value of statistical circumstantial evidence is made 
explicit for the jury is part of Professor Tribe’s concern about the risk associated 
with this evidence.  See Tribe, supra note 35, at 1331 (“[I]n at least some 
contexts, permitting any use of certain mathematical methods entails a 
sufficiently high risk of misuse .  .  . that it would be irrational not to take such 
misuse into account when deciding whether to permit the methods to be 
employed at all.”). 
63 Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 35, at 252. 
64 See Peter Tillers & Jonathan Gottfried, A Collateral Attack on the Legal 
Maxim That Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt in Unquantifiable, 5 LAW, 
PROB., & RISK 135, 142 (2007) (“In short, although it is not possible to do 
statistics without doing probability, it is possible to do probability without doing 
statistics.”); Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. 
REV. 401, 421 n.67 (1986) (arguing that the distinction between “naked 
statistical evidence” and “personalized” evidence is “insupportable”). 
65 See Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 35, at 252 (“Overtly probabilistic 
evidence, however, makes the risk of error explicit.”). 
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problem arising from statistical evidence; rather, it is a problem 
that potentially arises from all circumstantial evidence. The use of 
statistical evidence in the blue bus and gatecrasher hypothetical 
merely defined the problem with more clarity. 
 
IV. HOUCHENS V. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. 
 
The case of Houchens v. American Home Assurance Co.66 
involves a clear application of the confidence principle in a real-
world —as opposed to a hypothetical—case, and thus serves as a 
nice transition to the discussion of Matsushita in the following 
section.  In Houchens, a woman brought a life insurance policy 
claim after her husband had gone missing.67 The husband had been 
overseas for a job in Saudi Arabia when he took a trip to Bangkok, 
Thailand.68 Although immigration records revealed that he had 
arrived in Bangkok and entered the country,69 he had not been seen 
or heard from since his arrival.70 After approximately eight years,71 
the wife, the policy’s beneficiary, brought suit against the life 
insurer.72 The wife was the beneficiary under the policy.73 In order 
to recover on the policy, the wife needed to show that her husband 
had died of accidental causes.74 Under a Virginia statute, she was 
entitled to a presumption that her husband had died because he had 
been missing for over seven years, but in order to recover under 
the policy she still needed to prove that he had died of an 
accidental cause.75 The insurance company brought a motion for 
summary judgment regarding the question of whether the 
husband’s death (presumed as a matter of law to have occurred) 
had been accidental.76 
                                                
66 927 F.2d 163 (4th Cir. 1991). 








75 Id. at 165. 
76 Id. at 164–65. 
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The district court granted the motion,77 and the wife appealed 
to the Fourth Circuit.78 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the order of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The Fourth Circuit 
acknowledged the lack of available direct evidence regarding the 
husband’s cause of death,79 and noted that the case depended upon 
the effect of the “highly” circumstantial evidence contained in the 
record. In addition, the court acknowledged that although the 
“sparse” circumstantial evidence in the case—that the husband 
entered Thailand during a vacation from his job in Saudi Arabia—
supported an inference of accidental death, the same evidence was 
also consistent with non-accidental causes of death such as suicide, 
murder, or natural causes.80   
If Houchens is considered from a probability analysis only, the 
defendant’s summary judgment should have been reversed by the 
Second Circuit.  The material fact (Material Fact M) was the 
manner in which the husband died. The record contained the 
undisputed facts involving the husband’s vacation to Thailand 
(Fact X). Thus, this fits the model of circumstantial evidence 
developed in the previous section, in which the jury is asked to 
infer Material Fact M from Fact X: Fact X    Fact M. The court 
in Houchens acknowledged that deducing Fact M from Fact X was 
reasonable. Indeed, the court expressly conceded that “Mr. 
Houchens might have died accidentally.”81 If the court believed, 
based on the record evidence, that Mr. Houchens might have died 
accidentally, surely a jury would not have been unreasonable in 
reaching the same conclusion. Thus, the decision of the Fourth 
Circuit affirming the grant of summary judgment for the defendant 
cannot be explained through a probability analysis. 
However, the result in Houchens makes perfect sense under a 
confidence analysis. The problem in Houchens is not that it would 
be unreasonable to conclude that the husband died accidentally. 
Rather, the problem is that there is so little evidence regarding the 
manner of the husband’s death that there can be little confidence in 
                                                
77 Id. at 164. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 167–68. 
80 Id. at 167. 
81 Id. 
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any conclusion regarding probability on this point.  
Unfortunately, rather than clearly articulating the confidence 
principle as the true basis for the summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant in Houchens, the Second Circuit justified its decision 
using language that is sometimes described as the “equal 
inferences rule.”82 In Houchens, the court states: 
This is a case where the inferences show equal 
support for opposing conclusions. Mr. Houchens 
might have died accidentally. However, it is equally 
likely that he was murdered, that he died of natural 
causes, that he took his own life, or that he just went 
away somewhere and lives yet.83 
The Houchens court is not alone in using the equal inferences 
“rule” as justification for summary judgment in a case in which 
there is very little available evidence on a probative fact; many 
courts have dealt with the problem of the scarcity of evidence 
regarding a material fact by resorting to this “rule.”84  Inreality, 
                                                
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 The most famous application of the equal inference rule might have 
occurred in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333 (1933).  In 
Chamberlain, the Court considered an appeal by a plaintiff against whom a 
directed verdict had been entered at the trial court level.  See id. at 333.  The 
plaintiff wished to rely on circumstantial evidence to show that the employees of 
the defendant had been negligent and had caused the death of the plaintiff.  See 
id. at  337–38.  In affirming the trial court’s directed verdict (contrary to the 
reversal by Judge Learned Hand writing for the Second Circuit), the Supreme 
Court stated:   
We, therefore, have a case belonging to that class of cases 
where proven facts give equal support to each of two 
inconsistent inferences; in which event, neither of them being 
established, judgment, as a matter of law, must go against the 
party upon whom rests the necessity of sustaining one of these 
inferences as against the other, before he is entitled to recover. 
Id. at 339. This passage, containing equal inference type language, suggests that 
the underlying problem in Chamberlain was the scarcity of record evidence on 
the disputes question of fact.  Under this reading, Chamberlain is similar to a 
case such as Houchens that is clearly based on a confidence analysis.  On the 
other hand, other portions of the Chamberlain case suggest that the Court’s 
decision was based on a probability analysis. See, e.g., id. at 342–43 (generally 
dismissing the probative value of the plaintiff’s evidence). 
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though, the equal inference rule is just a somewhat inarticulate 
explanation of the result required when the plaintiff has failed to 
satisfy the confidence analysis within the burden of production. 
Pursuant to the usual explanation of the equal inferences rule, 
when there is circumstantial evidence of a material fact that offers 
precisely equal support for both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s 
respective positions on that material fact, summary judgment is 
appropriate against the party with the burden of proof at trial.85 The 
theory is that the burden of production is not met because the 
evidence is equally consistent with the plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
versions of the material facts, and in this situation the burden of 
persuasion at trial would necessitate that this tie be resolved 
against the party on which the burden of persuasion rests.86 
Even though there is a superficial appeal to the “equal 
inferences” rule as a clever melding of the burden of production 
and burden of persuasion,87 a closer inspection reveals the 
analytical deficiencies in this train of thought. The problem with 
the “equal inferences” rule, and the problem with using this rule as 
an explanation for a case like Houchens, is that the rule presumes 
that a court—as opposed to a jury—is to analyze the probative 
strength of circumstantial evidence and come to a precise 
conclusion as to the probabilities of that disputed material fact.88 
                                                
 In any event, there are numerous cases in which the court’s reliance on the 
equal inferences rule is clearly based on a perceived lack of confidence in any 
probability conclusion drawn from the record because of the scant evidence on a 
disputed, material fact.  See, e.g., Dorsaneo, supra note 8, at 1710–11 
(examining case law with regard to the equal inferences rule and concluding that 
most courts have, correctly, rejected the rule); see also Michael S. Pardo & 
Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 15 
(2011) (employing an equal-inferences analysis as part of their advocacy of the 
‘inferences to the best explanation’ understanding of the burden of persuasion). 
85 See Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tex. 
1984) (“When circumstances are consistent with either of the two facts and 
nothing shows that one is more probable than the other, neither fact can be 
inferred.”). 
86 See, e.g., Simmons v. Blodgett, 110 F.3d 39, 41–42 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(explaining the rule). 
87 For a complete discussion of the relationship between the burden of 
production and the burden of persuasion, see Meier, supra note 1.   
88 See, e.g., Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 405 (1943) (Black, J., 
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This view of the judge’s responsibility with regard to the 
probability question is misguided89 The judge’s analysis of 
probability at the burden of production stage is deferential. The 
judge does not precisely determine the probative effect of the 
circumstantial evidence in the record, but rather the judge 
considers whether a jury’s conclusion on the material fact, for 
either the plaintiff or the defendant, would be reasonable.90 Under 
the equal inference rule, however, a judge is presumably to assign 
a rather specific percentage as to the probative effect of 
                                                
dissenting) (stating that the equal inferences rule “assumes that a judge can 
weigh conflicting evidence with mathematical precision”); Dorsaneo, supra note 
8, at 1710–11 (“[T]he ‘equal inferences rule’ is not merely unnecessary it is 
actually quite harmful.  In the hands of a reviewing judge who wants to violate 
the jury’s province so as to impose his or her own idiosyncratic preferences on 
the case, the ‘equal inferences rule’ [requires only that the judge] declare that the 
inferences are equal.”).  The equal inference rule does have some arguably 
legitimate hypothetical applications, but in these contrived situations the rule is 
better articulated as a rule of evidence as opposed to a rule of procedure.  For 
instances, if a plaintiff offers only circumstantial evidence of a material fact, and 
the plaintiff concedes (perhaps in the form of expert testimony) that this 
circumstantial evidence is exactly equally consistent with the plaintiff’s version 
of a material fact as the defendant’s version, summary judgment against the 
plaintiff would be appropriate.  Under this unusual situation, it is questionable 
whether this evidence would even meet the test for relevancy under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 401.  See FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevant evidence as 
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable that it 
would be without the evidence” (emphasis added)); cf. Roger C. Park et al., 
Bayes Wars Redivivus—An Exchange, in 8 INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE 1, 
10–38 (2010) (discussing—amongst other interesting issues—the relevance of 
evidence that is equally consistent with the plaintiff and the defendant’s 
explanation of the evidence).  In reality, however, a party’s attorney will almost 
always take the position that the circumstantial, non-statistical evidence makes 
that party’s version of a material fact more probable. Cf. Lozana v. Lozana, 52 
S.W.3d 141, 157 (Tex. 2001) (Hecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“It is a rule of logic, as well as law, that when the existence of a fact does 
not make one possible inference more probable than another, no inference can 
be drawn at all. For example, one cannot infer from a photograph showing the 
sun on the horizon that it is either sunrise or sunset; each is a possibility—
indeed, they are the only possibilities—but if nothing else is known, neither 
possibility is any more likely than the other.”). 
89 See Meier, supra note 1. 
90 See supra text at notes 74–80. 
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circumstantial evidence, and then—if the inferences to be drawn 
are exactly in equipoise—the judge is to enter judgment against the 
party with the burden of persuasion at trial.   
The equal inferences “rule” is thus flawed because it assumes 
that a judge precisely determines an exact estimate of the 
probabilities on a disputed material fact. Even apart from this error, 
however, the equal inference rule is internally nonsensical. For 
instance, consider a case in which the judge determines that the 
circumstantial evidence slightly favors the defendant’s version of a 
material fact. In this instance, the equal inference rule is—by 
definition—not triggered because the evidence does not equally 
support a conclusion for either the plaintiff or the defendant on a 
disputed question of material fact. But, notice the illogical result 
under the equal inferences “rule” if the judge believes that the 
defendant’s version of the facts is exactly as likely as the plaintiff’s 
version of the facts. In this scenario, according to the equal 
inferences rule, the judge is to enter summary judgment for the 
defendant. However, if the judge believes that the evidence slightly 
favors the defendant but that reasonable minds could differ on this 
conclusion, the judge is presumably required to submit the case to 
the jury. Under the equal inferences rule, then, the defendant is 
better off convincing the court that the circumstantial evidence 
favors each side equally than in convincing the court that the 
circumstantial evidence slightly favors the defendant! 
The equal inference “rule” could be understood as a rule that 
applies in cases like Houchens when judges intuitively realize that 
the defendant is entitled to summary judgment but that this 
conclusion cannot be justified under a probability analysis.  In 
other words, a case like Houchens presents a real-life judge with a 
real-life “paradox” similar to the “paradox” exposed in the blue 
bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals. The solution to this real-life 
“paradox” is the same as the solution to the “paradox” posed by the 
blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals: the confidence concept. In 
reality, a case such as Houchens does not present a paradox once 
the decision is understood from the perspective that there simply 
was not enough evidence to afford the legal system sufficient 
confidence in any probability assessment from that evidence. 
Clearly articulating the confidence concept is challenging, 
however, and the “equal inferences rule” is an unfortunate 
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byproduct of the difficulty associated with verbalizing the 
confidence concept. 
 
V.      MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO. V. ZENITH RADIO 
CORP.  
 
The Matsushita Electric Industrial v. Zenith Radio 
Corporation91 litigation involved an antitrust claim by two 
American corporations against twenty-one Japanese corporations.92 
Both the plaintiffs and defendants were in the business of 
producing television sets, with the defendants selling their products 
in both the Japanese and American markets.93 The plaintiffs 
claimed that the defendants illegally conspired to keep the price of 
their television sets artificially low in the American market.94 The 
ultimate goal of this conspiracy, according to the plaintiffs, was to 
drive American television set producers out of the American 
market.95 To prevail on their claims, the plaintiffs had to prove that 
the defendants’ low prices in the United States were the result of 
an actual agreement among the defendants.96  Under well-
established antitrust principles, if the various defendants’ prices 
were simply the result of independent, parallel conduct by each of 
the defendants, no liability existed.97 
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
granted summary judgment for the defendants.98 The Supreme 
Court summarized the district court’s conclusion as follows: “At 
bottom, the court found, [Plaintiffs’] claims rested on the 
inferences that could be drawn from [defendants’] parallel conduct 
in the Japanese and American markets, and from the effects of that 
conduct on [Defendants’] American competitors.”99 Thus, although 
                                                
91 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
92 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 577. 
93 Id. at 577–78. 
94 Id. at 578. 
95 Id. at 577–78. 
96 Id. at 584–86. 
97 Id. at 588 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 
752, 764 (1984)). 
98 Id. at 579. 
99 Id. 
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the plaintiffs had not asserted a viable legal claim by simply 
proving that the defendants had all sold television sets at 
artificially high prices in Japan and artificially low prices in the 
United States, the plaintiffs wished to use this parallel conduct as 
circumstantial evidence that an illegal conspiracy existed between 
the defendants.100 Using the model of circumstantial evidence 
developed above,101 the plaintiffs wished to introduce testimony 
(Testimony X) about parallel conduct (Fact X) to prove a 
conspiracy (Fact M): Testimony X   Fact X  Fact M.  
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment.102 The Third Circuit 
concluded “that a reasonable factfinder could find a conspiracy to 
depress prices in the American market in order to drive out 
American competitors, which conspiracy was funded by excess 
profits obtained in the Japanese market.”103 The Supreme Court 
subsequently reversed the Third Circuit.104 
Determining the precise rationale for the Court’s decision in 
Matsushita is a difficult task; commentators have struggled with 
the case for over twenty-five years.105 Figuring out Matsushita is a 
bit like trying to solve a Rubik’s Cube: there are different sides to 
the problem, and while it might appear that you have solved the 
problem from one side, turning the Cube to a different side reveals 
that the maneuvers you have made to solve one side of the Cube 
have scrambled the other sides. Along these lines, any serious 
                                                
100 Id. at 584–85. 
101 See supra Part III. 
102 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 580. 
103 Id. at 581. 
104 Id. at 598. 
105 See generally Nickolai G. Levin, The Nomos and Narrative of 
Matsushita, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 1631 (2005)  (“Nineteen years later, 
courts and commentators still struggle to decipher what the Matsushita standard 
requires and how to reconcile that with the Court’s prior summary judgment 
jurisprudence, which was generally plaintiff permissive. Matsushita’s broad 
language created many questions: Should judges limit inferences at the summary 
judgment stage in all antitrust cases or only a subset (and, if so, which subset)? 
When ascertaining whether the evidence ‘tends to exclude’ the possibility of 
independent action, should the judge weigh the evidence? How are deterrence 
concerns related to that standard? Does Matsushita apply outside antitrust?”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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account of Matsushita must take into account the following aspects 
of the case: (1) the language in the opinion pronouncing that the 
Court was reviewing the legal standard for summary judgment; (2) 
the language suggesting that the Court’s decision was based on the 
Court’s view of the probability of the alleged conspiracy; (3) the 
language indicating that the antitrust context of the dispute was 
important to the Court’s analysis; (4) the Court’s reliance on its 
previous holding in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.106; 
(5) the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure; (6) the Seventh Amendment right to a federal jury trial; 
(7) the Court’s subsequent description of the Matsushita holding in 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.107; (8) the 
contemporary view that Matsushita is a critically important 
precedent; and (9) the notion that Matsushita helps defendants and 
hurts plaintiffs. 
As it turns out, Matsushita is a Rubik’s Cube that cannot be 
completely solved; no interpretation of Matsushita can account for 
all of the above factors, meaning that something has to give. 
However, the interpretation of Matsushita advanced in this 
Article—that Matsushita was decided according to a confidence 
analysis similar to that involved in the blue bus and gatecrasher 
hypotheticals and the Houchens case discussed above—comes 
pretty close to accounting for all of these variables. What is 
ultimately sacrificed is the language in the Matsushita opinion 
suggesting that the case depended upon the Court’s view of the 
probability of the conspiracy alleged by the Plaintiffs, although I 
offer a theory as to how this language made its way into the 
Court’s opinion. In addition, the contemporary view that 
Matsushita is an important summary judgment precedent must be 
reevaluated. Although Matsushita is still an important case under 
the theory advanced herein, it is not the “game-changing” 
precedent that dramatically alters the respective roles of the trial 
court judge and jury with regard to disputed questions of fact. The 
case is sometimes read and used in this manner, but this 
interpretation should be rejected. 
The dissection of Matsushita below is, admittedly, somewhat 
                                                
106 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
107 504 U.S. 451, 478–79 (1992). 
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tedious. Considering the import of Matsushita, however, this 
scrutiny is justified. Properly understanding the case as one 
decided according to a confidence inquiry (1) requires a 
reassessment of the summary judgment “revolution” that was 
prompted in part by Matsushita and (2) justifies the plausibility 
standard introduced by the Court in Twombly.  In light of the 
stakes involved, a thorough and detailed examination of 
Matsushita is warranted.   
 
A. The Probability Understanding of Matsushita 
 
There are two fundamental ways to read Matsushita: through 
the probability principle and the confidence principle. This section 
discusses the probability reading.  Under this reading, Matsushita 
revolved around the probability of the alleged conspiracy. This is 
the way that most lower courts and commentators have read 
Matsushita.108 However, there are serious problems with this view 
of the case. 
The Matsushita litigation depended upon the effect to be given 
circumstantial evidence. Recall that the dispositive factual question 
in the Matsushita litigation was whether the defendants’ parallel, 
low prices on television sets sold in the United States were the 
result of independent action or an agreement among the 
defendants.109 The plaintiffs had no direct evidence that an 
                                                
108 See, e.g., Nancy Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional 
Restraint and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 
329 (1989) (“The result and reasoning in Matsushita virtually command the trial 
judge to invade the jury’s province . . . .”). 
109 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 596–97. Of course, determining what 
distinguishes “independent action” from an “agreement” is a question of law, 
and the resolution of this legal question is more complex than it might initially 
appear.  See generally William H. Page, Communication and Concerted Action, 
38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 405–65 (2007) (concluding that the concept of an 
illegal antitrust agreement can only exist if there is communication between the 
conspirators and demonstrating that the recent cases support his definition, 
despite the contrasting school of thought (led by Judge Richard Posner) that tacit 
agreements and interdependent conduct also falls within the prohibition of 
Section of the Sherman Act); see also William H. Page, The Gary Dinners and 
the Meaning of Concerted Action, 62 SMU L. REV. 597 (2009) (discussing 
whether the infamous “Gary dinners,” in which American steel executives 
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agreement had been reached; there was no “smoking gun” witness 
to testify to witnessing an agreement being reached or to seeing a 
document memorializing the agreement.  Thus, the illegal 
agreement would have to be proven by circumstantial evidence. 
The plaintiffs had a variety of circumstantial evidence 
suggesting that the parallel low prices set by defendants in the 
United States were the result of an agreement. First, of course, was 
the fact that the defendants’ prices were uniformly low.110 In 
attempting to prove a conspiracy to agree to set low prices, it is 
obviously necessary that the prices be uniformly low.111 It would 
make no sense for the plaintiffs to allege a conspiracy to engage in 
certain conduct when that conduct has not, in fact, occurred.112 As 
the Court noted in Matsushita, however, the fact that the 
defendants were uniformly selling television sets in the United 
States at low prices could also be explained by independent action 
by each of the defendants.113 Although this might initially seem 
improbable (how often do twenty-one people or entities engage in 
the exact some behavior without some sort of agreement?), if the 
                                                
gathered for a frank exchange of information regarding their businesses 
(including wages and prices), constitute an illegal agreement under the Sherman 
Act).  The Supreme Court, in Matsushita, assumed that the dispositive question 
to the litigation was a factual one as to whether an agreement existed and not 
over the definition of what constitutes an agreement, and this Article will 
proceed under the same assumption. 
110 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584. 
111 It is theoretically possible that the government might initiate a 
prosecution for an agreement that was later backed out of, but this seems 
unlikely. 
112 In this instance, the plaintiff pursuing a civil cause of action would not 
have suffered damages if an agreement—but no conduct—had occurred.  It is 
the act that produces the damages to the plaintiff. This should be distinguished, 
however, from the criminal prosecution of a conspiracy.  In the criminal context, 
the legislature might have an interest in prohibiting an agreement to engage in a 
conspiracy even the agreement does not result in action.   See United States v. 
Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11, 15–17 (1994) (upholding a criminal conviction under 
federal statute prohibiting conspiracy to distribute narcotics even though no 
overt act by the defendant had been proven); see also had occurred); see also 
Model Penal Code § 5.03(5) (stating that an overt act must be alleged and 
proved except in cases where the crime conspired to is a first or second degree 
felony). 
113 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586–87. 
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companies were each independently reacting to the same market 
conditions, the parallel conduct could actually be the result of 
independent action. Consider, for instance, the trend of cola 
companies to produce diet versions of their products. This common 
strategy by each of the cola makers was obviously not the result of 
an agreement amongst the producers. Rather, each producer was 
responding to the same market conditions—demand by consumers 
for diet versions of cola. 
The Matsushita plaintiffs’ evidence went beyond the 
defendants’ parallel conduct of uniformly low prices in the United 
States, however. The plaintiffs also had direct evidence that the 
defendants had actually engaged in other agreements or 
conspiracies.114 The plaintiffs had direct testimony that the 
defendants had cooperated to maintain artificially high prices for 
their products in the Japanese market.115 Similarly, the plaintiffs 
also had evidence that the defendants had cooperated in various 
ways in the American market, albeit not in ways that gave rise to a 
claim by the plaintiffs against the defendants.116 This evidence was 
clearly probative of whether the defendants’ low prices in the 
American market were the result of a conspiracy. If the defendants 
had entered into, maintained, and enforced business agreements in 
other settings, the likelihood is greater that the defendants had 
done so in the manner alleged by plaintiffs. If one wants to prove 
that Bonnie and Clyde entered into a conspiracy to rob a particular 
bank, it is helpful to establish that Bonnie and Clyde had worked 
together on previous projects. 
The  Supreme  Court’s  opinion  in  Matsushita,  however, 
focuses  mostly  on  another  bit  of  circumstantial  evidence  
rather than  that  discussed  above.  The  plaintiffs’  theory  in 
Matsushita  was  that  the  defendants  had  agreed  to artificially  
hold  their  prices  low  in  an  effort  to  eventually force  the  
plaintiffs  out  of  the  American  market.117  This  business  
strategy  is  often  called  “predatory  pricing.”118  As the  academic  
                                                
114 Id. at 580–81. 
115 Id. at 580. 
116 Id. at 596. 
117 Id. at 578. 
118 Id. at 584, n.8. 
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literature  cited  by  the  Court  notes,119 predatory  pricing  is  a  
somewhat  risky  business  strategy because  it  requires  a  
company  to  forgo  present  gains (represented  by  the  higher  
price  that  could  currently  be charged for the product) in the 
hopes of capitalizing on larger gains in the future when 
competition has been eliminated.120 According to the plaintiffs’ 
complaint in Matsushita, the defendants conspired to engage in an 
ambitious predatory pricing scheme that required the elimination 
of well-established American companies over a long period of 
time.121 In Matsushita, the Court discusses the ambitious nature of 
the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy and suggests that the 
defendants did not have a “motive” to enter the conspiracy. 122 To 
                                                
119 Id. at 589. 
120 Id. at 588–89. 
121 Id. at 590. 
122 Admittedly, the Court’s use of the term “motive” in Matsushita is a 
somewhat obscure manner of saying that the Court doubted the existence of the 
conspiracy.  Alleged antitrust conspirators always have a motive to engage in an 
illegal antitrust conspiracy—to increase their profits.  Whether that motive 
results in a conspiracy depends (among on other factors) on whether the 
conspirators believe the arrangement can be successfully implemented, and the 
likelihood—and cost—of antitrust litigation if the conspiracy is successful.   
Under the probability reading of Matsushita, the Court doubted that a conspiracy 
such as the one alleged by the plaintiff could be successfully executed.  (The 
Court presumably, then, believed that the alleged conspirators would come to 
the same conclusion regarding the likelihood of success of that conspiracy.)  
Saying that there is no “motive” to engage in the activity, however, essentially 
hides the underlying assumption on which that conclusion regarding “motive” is 
based. 
 Moreover, some have doubted that a conspiracy need always be motivated 
by a desire to increase profits.  For instance, in his Matsushita dissent, Justice 
White considers that a firm might be motivated by growth rather than profit-
maximization.  See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 598 (White, J., dissenting).  Others 
have explained that a desire for “workforce stability and industrial growth” 
might justify a preference for growth over profit-maximization.  David F. 
Shores, Narrowing the Sherman Act Through an Extension of Colgate: The 
Matsushita Case, 55 TENN. L. REV. 261, 285 (1988); see also Michael J. 
Kaufman, Summary Pre-Judgment:  The Supreme Court’s Profound, 
Persuasive, and Problematic Presumption About Human Behavior, 43 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 593, 595 (2012) (arguing that Matsushita’s “presumption that persons 
and businesses make purely rational choices with a singular intent to maximize 
their wealth” has been “discredited”). 
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play on the analogy made previously: Why would Bonnie and 
Clyde conspire to rob a heavily-guarded bank when there is a good 
chance that the bank’s vaults would be empty on the day of the 
robbery?123  
In addition to the “motive” language, other language in 
Matsushita also suggests that the Court’s conclusion was based on 
a probability assessment. The Court discusses the “implausible”124 
nature of the alleged conspiracy and the necessity that the plaintiffs 
come forward with “more persuasive evidence”125 to support their 
claim. The Court mentions that the length of time under which this 
conspiracy has continued suggests that “the conspiracy does not in 
fact exist.”126 Moreover, the Court discounted the value of the 
record evidence showing that the defendants had previously 
worked together to form agreements regarding business operations 
in both the Japanese and American markets.127 
Although these portions of Matsushita suggest a probability 
analysis,128 problems arise under this interpretation. To 
demonstrate these problems, it will be helpful to quickly examine 
the nature of a judge’s probability analysis at the summary 
judgment stage. In this regard, consider the following depiction of 
a judge’s analysis of probability at the summary judgment stage:129 
                                                
123 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 590. 
124 Id. at 587. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 592. 
127 The Court’s opinion also discounts the plaintiffs’ expert report. Id. at 
594 n.19 (“[I]n our view the expert opinion evidence of below-cost pricing has 
little probative value in comparison with the economic factors, discussed in Part 
IV-A, supra, that suggest that such conduct is irrational.”). 
128 See, e.g., Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Summary Judgment in Rhode Island: 
Is It Time to Wrap the Mantra in Celotex?, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS. U. L. REV. 153, 
170 (1997) (“Matsushita clearly requires the trial judge to thoroughly assess the 
facts—dare I say weigh?—in order to determine if a jury could reach one or 
more conclusions supported by the evidence.”). 
129 The development of this chart is more fully discussed in Probability, 
Confidence, and the Reasonable Jury Standard. See Meier, supra note 1. 




In Figure A, the probability issue is charted horizontally, with 
the right side of the line representing 100% probability that the 
material fact alleged by the plaintiff did—in fact—occur, and the 
left side of the chart representing 0% probability that alleged 
material fact occurred. Because a judge’s analysis regarding 
probability at summary judgment is merely to determine whether 
to send the case to the jury, the judge asks only whether a 
reasonable jury could resolve the disputed question of fact for 
either the plaintiff or the defendant.130 The nature of this judicial 
inquiry explains the remaining features of Figure A. First, because 
the judge is considering how the jury might reasonably resolve the 
disputed question of fact, the burden of persuasion applicable to 
the jury’s decision must be considered. In Figure A, the usual 
burden of persuasion used for civil litigation—a preponderance of 
the evidence—has been used and marked at the corresponding 
50% probability point. Second, recall that the role of a judge is not 
to act as the fact-finder, but rather to determine whether the record 
is such that a jury would be reasonable in deciding the case for 
either party to the dispute. Thus, a judge must assign a range of 
probability assessments that represents a “reasonable” conclusion 
from the evidence. This notion is captured by the shaded bar on top 
of the horizontal probability continuum. In Figure A, the judge has 
                                                
130 The reasonable jury standard nicely captures the relation between judge 
and jury with regard to probability (albeit not with regard to confidence). See 
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examined the record evidence and concluded that a range of 
probability conclusions from the evidence would be reasonable. 
Because the range assigned by the judge extends over the 50% 
probability point associated with the preponderance of the 
evidence burden of persuasion, a jury would be reasonable in 
resolving the disputed question of fact in favor of either the 
plaintiff or the defendant. Thus, summary judgment is not 
appropriate in Figure A and the case must proceed to a jury trial. 
Of course, in Matsushita, the Court did conclude that summary 
judgment—for the defendants—was appropriate. Thus, if the Court 
decided Matsushita according to a probability analysis, the range 
of reasonable probability assessments (on the question of whether 
the defendants had, in fact, engaged in an illegal conspiracy) must 
have been wholly to the left of the relevant preponderance of the 
evidence standard. This might occur for two different reasons. A 
discussion of each follows below.   
 
1. The “No Chance!” Probability Interpretation of 
Matsushita 
 
The first probability interpretation of Matsushita I will label as 
the “No Chance!” interpretation.  Under this view, the Court 
thought the alleged conspiracy was extremely unlikely. Thus, the 
probability range assigned by the Court in Matsushita was 
completely to the left of the preponderance of the evidence point 
because, even allowing for “reasonable” differences, a jury could 
not legitimately conclude that the conspiracy had—more likely 
than not—actually occurred.  This variation of the probability 
understanding of Matsushita is depicted below in Figure B: 













Under Figure B, the Matsushita Court would start with the 
presumption that the plaintiffs’ conspiracy was extremely 
improbable. Even after allowing for reasonable disagreements 
regarding the probative value of the record, the range of reasonable 
conclusions did not extend beyond the relevant 50% mark 
associated with the preponderance of the evidence standard. Thus, 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant was appropriate. 
The “No Chance!” view of Matsushita is flatly inconsistent 
with portions of the Matsushita opinion. Indeed, the Court was 
careful to emphasize that its decision to reinstate the trial court’s 
grant of summary judgment was not simply the result of a 
disagreement with the Third Circuit over the probative value of the 
record evidence. Matsushita opens with the following declaration: 
“This case requires that we again consider the standard district 
courts must apply when deciding whether to grant summary 
judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case.”131 To underscore this 
point, Matsushita reiterates “that we review only the standard 
applied by the Court of Appeals in deciding this case, and not the 
weight assigned to particular pieces of evidence.”132 In each of 
these statements, the Court seems to be stressing that the issue 
before the Court involves a question about the legal standard for 
summary judgment.   
Under the “No Chance!” view of Matsushita, however, the 
Court’s conclusion was based solely on the Court’s analysis of the 
                                                
131 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added). 
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probative value it assigned to the various pieces of circumstantial 
evidence in the record. This evaluation of evidence and assigning 
of probabilities is not a legal inquiry into the standard governing 
summary judgment but rather an inquiry into the probative value of 
a particular evidentiary record. The Court in Matsushita seemed to 
be adamant, though, that the result did not depend on this sort of 
evidentiary inquiry. The problem with the Third Circuit’s 
conclusion, according to the Court, was not that it had come to the 
wrong conclusion regarding the probative value of the evidence 
but that it had used the wrong legal standard.133 Thus, unless the 
Court misstated its reasoning in Matsushita, the opinion did not 
depend simply on the Court’s own views regarding the probative 
value of the evidence. 
Not surprisingly, then, nobody seems to interpret Matsushita as 
simply a product of Justices Powell, Burger, Rehnquist, Marshall, 
and O’Connor’s134 views regarding the probability value of the 
record evidence in that case. Primarily, the debate regarding 
Matsushita has been whether the “new” legal approach to 
summary judgment contained therein should be limited to the 
antitrust context only or applied broadly to other cases. Even those 
who believe Matsushita applies only to the antitrust context do not 
do so under the theory that the case hinged on the Court’s own 
view of the probability of an agreement in that particular case.135 
Thus, there seems to be a general consensus that Matsushita is an 
important case that informs the legal standard a trial court judge 
must apply in deciding summary judgment. The analysis of the 
Court pursuant to the “No Chance!” interpretation of Matsushita 
does not address the standard a district court judge must apply at 
the summary judgment stage but merely represents the result that 
must occur in a particular case when a court believes the summary 
judgment evidence produced in that litigation is predominantly 
one-sided. 
                                                
133 Id. 
134 These five Justices constituted the majority in Matsushita. See id. at 
576. 
135 See Schwarzer & Hirsch, supra note 16, at 6–7 (concluding that 
Matsushita “rests on a specific point of antitrust law” that precludes plaintiffs 
from relying solely on legal business conduct to prove an illegal antitrust 
agreement). 
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2. The “What is Reasonable?” Probability 
Interpretation of Matsushita 
 
A second way the Court could have used a probability analysis 
to reach the conclusion that the Matsushita defendants were 
entitled to summary judgment is the “What Is Reasonable?” 
probability view. Under this view, the reason that the probability 
range was to the left of the preponderance of the evidence point 
was because the Court redefined the allowance judges should make 
for “reasonable” disagreements over probability of a material fact 











In Figure C, summary judgment is appropriate because the 
range of probability assessments representing “reasonable” jury 
conclusions shrank. Since the Court was less generous in 
characterizing deviations from the Court’s own views regarding 
probability as “reasonable,” the case is now one in which the only 
reasonable probability conclusions from the summary judgment 
record are to the left of the important burden of persuasion point. 
Thus, a decision in favor of the defendant at the summary 
judgment stage is appropriate because a jury verdict for the 
defendant is the only reasonable conclusion from the record 
evidence. 
The “What Is Reasonable?” probability view of Matsushita 
addresses one of the shortcomings associated with the “No 
Chance!” view. The “What Is Reasonable?” view of Matsushita is 
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before the court was the “standard district courts must apply when 
deciding whether to grant summary judgment in an antitrust 
conspiracy case.”136 According to the “What is Reasonable?” 
reading of Matsushita, the Supreme Court’s legal standard was 
different from the standard used by the Court of Appeals because 
the Supreme Court’s standard required district court judges to be 
less tolerant in establishing the range of “reasonable” conclusions 
that could be drawn from a summary judgment record.137 Thus, the 
Court’s characterization of the issue presented in Matsushita as 
involving the summary judgment standard (rather than the 
application of that standard to a particular case) is consistent with 
the “What is Reasonable?” understanding of Matsushita. 
In addition, the “What is Reasonable?” view of Matsushita is 
consistent with the widely-held view that Matsushita is an 
important case regarding the law of summary judgment. If the 
Court decided in Matsushita that trial court judges should 
generally be less willing to allow for deviations from their own 
                                                
136 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 576. 
137 Because courts (at both the trial court level and the appellate level) do 
not use mathematical expressions to delineate their views of the “reasonable” 
range of probability assessments from a particular evidentiary record, it is 
somewhat difficult to conceive how an appellate court would know that a lower 
court was applying the wrong standard in performing this task.  Nevertheless, I 
believe that it is a mistake to assume that the standard is being misapplied if 
appellate courts are frequently reversing the grant of summary judgment by 
lower courts. See, e.g.,  Jeffrey W. Stempel, Taking Cognitive Illiberalism 
Seriously: Judicial Humility, Aggregate Efficiency, and Acceptable Justice, 43 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 627, (2012) (“Grants of summary judgment are reversed at too 
high a rate to have been properly granted. The very premise of summary 
judgment is that there are no genuine disputes of material fact, that no 
reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant, and that the law is so clear that 
there is no valid reason to postpone entry of judgment. By these standards, the 
grant of summary judgment (partial or whole) by a federal district judge (at least 
on no-genuine-dispute-of-fact grounds) should be affirmed nearly 100% of the 
time.”). Any legal principle, regardless of whether it is a clear rule or a murky 
standard, will involve close cases whose resolution is not clear. Stated 
differently, reasonable minds can disagree on what is reasonable, and those 
types of cases are much more likely to show up on an appellate docket. See 
Sward, supra note 16, at 575 (“[W]hat is ‘reasonable’ [under the reasonable jury 
test] is often in the eyes of beholder, meaning that the [reasonable jury] test 
gives judges more power.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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view of probability, the case dramatically altered the relationship 
between trial court judge and jury with regard to disputed 
questions of material fact. According to this view, the Matsushita 
analysis must be applied in all types of federal civil litigation, not 
just the antitrust context. Many scholars read Matsushita in this 
light.138 
However, this view of Matsushita is problematic on many 
fronts. First, it does not adequately account for the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial.139 This concern is best illustrated 
by pushing the concept associated with the “What is Reasonable” 
view of Matsushita to its logical extreme. This would result in 
completely removing the fact-finding process from the province of 
the jury (at least when there was no direct evidence on a material 
issue of fact). A judge would assign a probability assessment to 
any disputed fact, disregard any deviations as “unreasonable,” and 
then grant summary judgment to either the plaintiff or defendant 
depending on the conclusion reached by the judge. Obviously, this 
result would not be desirable—nor would it be constitutional.140 
No one has advocated for this view of Matsushita.  
But even without such an absolute interpretation of the case, 
there is at least141 tension between Matsushita and both the 
                                                
138 See Miller, supra note 16, at 1068–69, nn.456–63 (listing cases applying 
Matsushita outside of the antitrust context); see also Christopher R. Leslie, 
Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 338 (2010) 
(“[Matsushita] is frequently taught in civil procedure classes as a summary 
judgment case, not an antitrust case.”).  These conclusions are sometimes based 
upon the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image 
Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). See, e.g., Duane, supra note 10, 
1569 n.174 (1995) (concluding that Eastman resolves that Matsushita is not 
limited to the antitrust context); but see Levin, supra note 105, at 1631–32 
(addressing the question “Does Matsushita apply outside antitrust?” and 
concluding that Eastman does not resolve the issue).  For a discussion of 
Kodak’s description of the Matsushita decision, see infra Subsection V(B)(3).  
139 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
140 See Daniel P. Collins, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence, 
40 STAN. L. REV. 491, 492 (1988) (“If the judge is given too much leeway in 
deciding what a ‘rational’ jury would find, this may infringe on the non-
movant’s seventh amendment right to a jury trial.”). 
141 Some commentators have argued that any involvement by a trial court 
judge in determining the probability of a material fact is a violation of the 
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Seventh Amendment’s protection of the right to a civil jury trial 
and the Supreme Court’s frequent admonition that a trial judge is 
not to substitute his or her opinion of the evidence for that of the 
jury.142 To state the concept slightly differently, if one assumes that 
a judge could not constitutionally disregard any contrasting 
conclusion from the summary judgment evidence as unreasonable, 
a decision to “shrink” the range of reasonable conclusions from the 
evidence moves closer to that constitutional line. Not surprisingly, 
the constitutionality of summary judgment was not seriously 
questioned (at least in contemporary discussions) until some lower 
courts (and commentators) viewed Matsushita as a green light to 
apply the reasonable standard in a new, aggressive manner.143 
For present purposes, it is not necessary to attempt to resolve 
precisely how much constitutional latitude a judge has in making a 
probability assessment from the record evidence and determining 
what sorts of conclusions might be “reasonable.” It is sufficient to 
establish that there is a constitutional line, and that the “What is 
Reasonable?” interpretation of Matsushita either crosses this line 
or, at the very least, edges towards this constitutional line. These 
constitutional concerns work against the “What is Reasonable?” 
interpretation of Matsushita. 
In addition to the Seventh Amendment concern created by the 
“What is Reasonable?” view, this view also cannot account for the 
antitrust-specific language in the opinion. At various places within 
the opinion, the Court acknowledged that the antitrust law context 
influenced its analysis. For instance, the Court accentuated the 
                                                
Seventh Amendment.  See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is 
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007) (arguing that modern summary 
judgment is unconstitutional because it permits a judge to engage in a 
probability analysis).  This issue is beyond the scope of this Article.  For present 
purposes, it is sufficient to note that, if the Supreme Court sanctioned a more 
“aggressive” application of the judge’s probability inquiry at summary 
judgment, this makes the potential Seventh Amendment problems more acute. 
142 See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) 
(“[A]t the summary judgment stage the trial judge’s function is not himself to 
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter . . . .”). 
143 See Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been 
A Material Change in Standards, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770, 771–75 (1988) 
(examining the effect of Matsushita, but not wanting to “reinvent the wheel,” on 
the constitutionality of summary judgment under the Seventh Amendment). 
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antitrust nature of the dispute at the beginning of the opinion when 
it framed the question to be analyzed: “This case requires that we 
again consider the standard district courts must apply when 
deciding whether to grant summary judgment in an antitrust 
conspiracy case.”144 Similarly, the Court stated that “antitrust law 
limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous 
evidence in a § 1  [Sherman Antitrust Act] case.”145 Later in the 
opinion, the Court explains the unique problems that can arise 
when a jury concludes that a defendant has predatorily priced 
when, in fact, this has not occurred: “[M]istaken inferences in 
[predatory pricing] cases such as this one are especially costly, 
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed 
to protect.”146 
Of course, a more refined version of the “What is 
Reasonable?” interpretation accounts for the opinion’s antitrust-
specific language. Under this more refined variation, trial courts 
should be less willing to defer to the jury only for antitrust cases or 
for particular types of antitrust cases.147 While this interpretation 
accounts for antitrust-specific language, there are still problems 
associated with it. The first is that—like the generic version of the 
“What is Reasonable?” interpretation—the antitrust-specific 
version seems to undermine Seventh Amendment principles. 
The justification for the antitrust-specific version would need 
to be based on the peculiar risks associated with resolving disputed 
questions of facts in the antitrust context. In Matsushita, the Court 
appears to offer such a justification: “mistaken inferences in 
                                                
144 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 576 
(1986) (emphasis added). 
145 Id. at 588. 
146 Id. at 594. This antitrust-specific language in Matsushita has never been 
accounted for by those who claim that Matsushita broadly altered the 
relationship between trial judge and jury in all federal, civil suits.  If the Court 
intended an across-the-board redefinition of the relationship between trial judge 
and jury, the antitrust-specific language in the opinion is misplaced and 
unnecessary. Thus, many commentators read Matsushita as a decision which 
should be confined only to the antitrust context. See supra note 16. 
147 See Levin, supra note 105, at 1646–51 (exploring different 
interpretations of Matsushita, including those that limit the case’s import to “all 
antitrust situations”). 
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[predatory pricing] cases such as this one are especially costly, 
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed 
to protect.”148 The “false positive”149 error that the Court appeared 
to be concerned with in Matsushita is only remedied, however, if 
trial court judges are somehow better than jurors at assessing 
probability from an evidentiary record, assuming that Matsushita 
was decided accorded to a probability theory. If judges are just as 
likely to falsely conclude that a conspiracy existed when it did not, 
the problem of false positives is not solved by telling judges to be 
more stringent in characterizing different conclusions from the 
record as “reasonable.”   
Of course, as an empirical matter, it is entirely possible that 
judges—as opposed to juries—are better equipped to assess 
probability in antitrust cases. Judges, after all, are pretty smart 
people and at least some of them might have more experience in 
                                                
148 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594.  The concern of the Court appears to be 
that a mistaken litigation conclusion regarding the factual question of whether a 
conspiracy existed might have the effect of deterring the type of “clean” 
competition on which a functioning market is based. In other words, someone 
who has a superior business model might refrain from engaging in the type of 
cutthroat (but socially useful) business practices that would take market share 
from a competitor, because these business practices might be mistaken for 
conduct illegal under antitrust law. The assumption made by the Court in 
expressing this concern is not necessarily sound. Unless the costs associated 
with a mistaken conclusion regarding the existence of an antitrust conspiracy 
outweigh the potential gains from delivering a superior product at a better price, 
a more efficient market participant will presumably have every incentive to 
maximize income by increasing market share. Granted, considering the treble 
damages associated with antitrust claims, the possibility that a mistaken 
conclusion could affect conduct at the margins does exist, but realistically it 
seems hard to fathom that a market participant would ever refrain from activity 
resulting in increased profits and market share simply because of the possibility 
that they might inaccurately be adjudged as having violated antitrust law. 
Nevertheless, even if the concern expressed by the Court might not have any (or 
little) effect from a wealth maximization standpoint, the concern expressed by 
the Court is at least valid from a wealth distribution perspective: A mistaken 
factual conclusion about the existence of antitrust conspiracy does result in a 
wealth transfer from a superior market participant to an inferior market 
participant. 
149 In the scientific community a “false positive” error is often referred to as 
a “Type I error.” See KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING 
SCIENCE 75 (MIT Press 1997). 
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antitrust matters than would a typical juror.150 Thus, it is possible 
(from an empirical point of view) that shifting the probability 
question from jury to judge—and this is the effect (at the margins, 
at least) of the “What is Reasonable?” interpretation of 
Matsushita—might improve the overall accuracy of the decision-
making process. 
Regardless, this line of thinking seems to run afoul of the 
Seventh Amendment. Even if the superiority of judges over juries 
in assessing probability could be empirically demonstrated—in 
antitrust cases or beyond—the probability decision has been 
constitutionally committed to the jury. As Professor Suja Thomas 
has emphatically stated, “[The Seventh Amendment] was the 
choice of the founders. Period. Any attempt to merge efficiency 
and the jury ignores the decision that the founders made—to have 
a jury trial right.”151 For better or worse, the Seventh Amendment 
gives juries the power to determine disputed questions of fact in a 
litigation context.  Even if the policy behind the Seventh 
Amendment was solely attributed to a belief that juries are more 
accurate than judges in assigning probabilities to disputed 
questions of material fact,152 empirically demonstrating the 
invalidity of this assumption does not justify a deviation from this 
constitutional decision. Thus, the same Seventh Amendment 
concerns that worked against the generic “What is Reasonable?” 
                                                
150 This presumption will not always be valid, or course.  A business 
executive sitting on a jury is probably better suited to determine the probability 
that an illegal antitrust conspiracy existed than is the typical federal court judge.   
151 Suja A. Thomas, Before and After the Summary Judgment Trilogy, 43 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J.499, 512–13 (2012). 
152 It seems relatively clear that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial 
is based on more than just the accuracy of jury decisions regarding material 
questions of fact.  See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of 
the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 670–71 (1973) (discussing the 
antifederalists’ arguments in favor of Seventh Amendment, which included the 
“protection of debtor defendants[,] the frustration of unwise legislation . . . the 
vindication of the interests of private citizens in litigation with the government[,] 
and the protection of litigants against overbearing and oppressive judges”); see 
also Kenneth S. Klein, The Validity of the Public Rights Doctrine in Light of the 
Historical Rationale of the Seventh Amendment, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
1013, 1013, 1017–18 (1994) (discussing the historical importance of the Seventh 
Amendment). 
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probability reading of Matsushita also undermine the more limited 
antitrust-only version of this probability theory.  
In addition to the Seventh Amendment concern, the anti-trust 
specific version is contrary to the transsubstantive nature of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Federal Rules establish the 
procedural rules that govern civil litigation in federal courts.153 It is 
well established that these procedural rules are to apply uniformly 
to all different types of substantive disputes,154 with a few 
exceptions to this transsubstantive principle specifically delineated 
within the text of various rules.155  Of course, these 
transsubstantive rules can be altered by positive law. This 
occurred, for instance, in the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(“PLRA”).156  In the PLRA, Congress imposed a procedural 
requirement, applicable to suits filed by prisoners “with respect to 
prison conditions,” that requires a prisoner plaintiff to exhaust 
potential administrative remedies within the prison system before 
filing suit in federal court.157  No such exhaustion requirement 
exists within the Federal Rules.158 
Despite Matsushita’s specific reliance on antitrust law, there is 
no antitrust statute that indicates a Congressional intent to alter the 
usual relationship—as established by the Federal Rules—between 
the judge and jury with regard to disputed questions of fact.  
Absent specific text indicating an intent to alter the standard 
approach contained within the Rules, the Supreme Court has 
consistently rejected attempts by lower courts to surmise this intent 
based on policy concerns: “[C]ourts should generally not depart 
from the usual practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of 
                                                
153 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil 
actions and proceedings in the United States district courts . . . .”). 
154 Id.  
155 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 9 (establishing a different pleading standard for 
certain types of cases). 
156 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-34, 110 Stat. 
1321 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (1996)). 
157 Id. 
158 See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002) (observing that, for 
plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims, exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
not generally required before filing suit in federal court). 
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perceived policy concerns.”159 Therefore, an antitrust-specific 
version would be contrary to the transsubstantive nature of the 
Federal Rules. 
Of course, this is not to say that the application of the Federal 
Rules to a particular dispute will always be blind to the substantive 
law involved in the litigation. This is obvious if one considers Rule 
8, which addresses whether a party has properly pleaded a claim 
for relief that can survive a motion to dismiss.160 A judge applying 
the standard from Rule 8—a “short and plain statement of the 
claim”161—cannot do so without considering the substantive law 
implicated by the dispute.  If the complaint alleges facts that are 
inconsistent with recovery under the substantive law, the complaint 
must be dismissed. This conclusion is reached, however, only by 
considering how the procedural standard of Rule 8 applies to the 
substantive law implicated by the dispute.162 A judge cannot know 
whether the plaintiff pleaded a “short and plain statement of the 
claim” unless the judge knows the legal claim involved in the 
dispute. 
The notion that the application of the Federal Rules will 
sometimes be informed by the substantive law at stake cannot 
explain the Matsushita Court’s reference to antitrust law, however, 
at least if Matsushita was decided under a probability theory. The 
                                                
159 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 200 (2007); see also id. at 214 (“We think 
that the PLRA’s screening requirement does not-explicitly or implicitly-justify 
deviating from the usual procedural practice beyond the departures specified by 
the PLRA itself.”).  This concept that the procedures established under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be changed without clear statutory 
language is a spin on the familiar principle that the Rules Enabling Act does not 
alter substantive rights.  If the question is one of procedure, the Federal Rules 
offer a default solution from which a deviation can be justified only with clear 
Congressional intent.   
160 FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
161 Id.; see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated by 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
162 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, 
Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 830 (2010) (explaining that a judge 
determining whether a complaint complies with Rule 8 must determine whether 
“any legal claim exists that would be consistent” with the factual allegations of 
the complaint). 
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probability issue relates to the likely existence of facts. Resolving 
who and how the existence of these facts will be determined is a 
legal question that is addressed in Rule 56. Resolving this legal 
issue—as opposed to the legal issue addressed in Rule 8—does not 
require a reference to the underlying substantive law. Disputed 
questions of fact must be resolved for all types of federal litigation; 
in light of the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules, the 
assumption should be that Rule 56 provides a uniform approach to 
resolving disputed questions of fact in federal litigation, absent 
specific Congressional guidance to the contrary. The antitrust-
specific version of the “What is Reasonable?” probability theory of 
Matsushita is based on the assumption that, because judges are 
better at resolving disputed questions of fact in the antitrust 
context, a judge should be less willing to accept differing factual 
perspectives on the record as “reasonable.” The transsubstantive 
nature of the Rules, however, seems to preclude this sort of pick-
and-choose approach. There is no satisfactory justification for a 
unique legal approach to resolving disputed question of antitrust 
facts without some clear signal that the transsubstantive nature of 
the Rules is inoperative; no such signal exists in the backdrop to 
Matsushita. 
To summarize, any interpretation of Matsushita that is based 
on the assumption that the Court’s decision depended upon a 
probability analysis results in grave problems. The notion that 
Matsushita derived from the Justices’ individual perspectives that 
there was little probability that the alleged conspiracy had actually 
occurred (the “No Chance!” interpretation) is inconsistent with the 
language of the opinion. This language confirms that the Court was 
interested in the standard applicable to summary judgment rather 
than the application of that standard to a particular evidentiary 
record.  
The “What is Reasonable?” interpretation of Matsushita 
improves upon the “No Chance!” interpretation by acknowledging 
that the Court was interested in the summary judgment standard 
rather than its application. Under the “What is Reasonable?” 
interpretation, the Court’s decision changed the summary judgment 
standard by directing lower courts to be less tolerant in defining 
the range of probability conclusions from the record evidence that 
qualify as reasonable. Some have, and continue, to interpret 
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Matsushita in this manner, but this view results in tension—if not 
an outright violation—of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury 
trial.  
Moreover, the “What is Reasonable?” view cannot account for 
the language that seems to place much emphasis on the antitrust 
nature of the dispute. This antitrust-specific language can be 
accounted for under a more refined version of the “What is 
Reasonable?” interpretation. Under this more limited 
interpretation, the Court believed that judges should be more 
reluctant to allow for reasonable disagreements regarding 
probability only when a case involves antitrust law or perhaps a 
specific issue within antitrust law. This variation of the “What is 
Reasonable?” view depends on the premise that, at least for 
antitrust cases, judges are more capable than juries in assessing the 
probability of the material facts in dispute.  Here again, though, 
this view seems to run afoul of the Seventh Amendment’s 
commitment to jury decision making with regard to disputed 
questions of material fact: even if judges are better at assessing 
probability in this specific context, this truth would not seem to 
justify a deviation from principles of the Seventh Amendment. 
Moreover, the antitrust-only version of the “What is Reasonable?” 
view of Matsushita seems to violate the transsubstantive principle 
of the Rules. 
Thus, despite the language in Matsushita that suggests that the 
Court’s decision rested on a probability analysis, multiple 
problems arise under this view. All of the problems are resolved, 
however, by a confidence reading of the case. 
 
B. The Confidence Reading of Matsushita 
 
In the same manner in which a confidence understanding 
resolves the “paradox” of the blue bus and gatecrasher 
hypotheticals, a confidence reading of Matsushita also resolves the 
many “paradoxes” that arise under a probability reading of the 
case. Under a confidence reading of Matsushita, summary 
judgment was necessary because an insufficient degree of 
confidence could be had in any probability assessment from the 
minimal circumstantial evidence in that case. Because of the state 
of the record in Matsushita, any conclusion regarding 
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probability—by either the judge or the jury—was going to be a 
rough guess based on incomplete information. 
The only other commentator to suggest anything akin to a 
confidence reading of Matsushita is Daniel Collins, in a 1988 
student note in the Stanford Law Review.163 Although Collins does 
not use the “confidence” terminology employed in this Article and 
by others such as Professor Neil Cohen,164 he does posit that an 
“alternate reading”165 of Matsushita would emphasize the notion 
that “permitting certain circumstantial inferences may have the 
effect of deterring perfectly legitimate conduct that the antitrust 
laws seek to protect.”166 This line of thinking focuses on the risk of 
false positives and the adequacy of information and not on the 
probability that an actual conspiracy occurred. In addition, Collins 
analogizes this interpretation of Matsushita to Professor Jonathan 
Cohen’s gatecrasher hypothetical.167 The confidence principle 
drives Collins’s note, even if the principle is not explicitly 
identified as such.168 
Collins does very little, however, to explain why this proposed 
interpretation of Matsushita is correct. And, in his defense, Collins 
might not have perceived the need to do so: when Collins wrote his 
student note in 1988, he could not have anticipated that the 
interpretation of Matsushita he was considering would be so 
important. The summary judgment “revolution” inspired by a 
probability reading of Matsushita had not yet occurred, and the 
plausibility standard of Twombly (which Matsushita, correctly 
understood, elucidates) was decades down the road. 
                                                
163 Daniel Collins, Note, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence, 
40 STAN. L. REV. 491, 492 (1988). 
164 See Cohen, supra note 38, at 399 (explaining the concept and term).   
165 Collins, supra note 140, at 507. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 511–12. 
168 Courts and commentators have occasionally cited Collins’s note, but 
unfortunately not for his primary thesis—his “alternate reading” of Matsushita. 
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1209 n.9 (1988); Paul W. Mollica, 
Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141, 153 n.69 
(2000) (both citing Collins’s article for generic points but neither discussing his 
“alternate reading” of Matsushita). 
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In any event, I aim to pick up where Collins left off in his 
impressive note: I wish to not only explain a confidence 
interpretation of Matsushita, but to demonstrate why this 
interpretation is correct. The remainder of this section will be 
devoted to the eight reasons why Matsushita should be read 
according to a confidence analysis.  
 
1. Different Fixes for Different Problems 
 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the superiority of a 
confidence reading of Matsushita, a few additional remarks 
regarding the distinction between probability and confidence are 
warranted. 
The probability interpretations of Matsushita discussed above 
all proceed along the following analytical path: because a jury 
might make an erroneous decision with regard to probability, this 
decision-making process should be shifted to judges. By shifting 
the probability question from juries to judges, the problem of 
“false positives” identified in Matsushita is avoided because judges 
are presumably superior to juries in performing a probability 
analysis. 
A confidence reading of Matsushita, however, proceeds along 
a dramatically different path. Under a confidence analysis, the 
problem is not with the jury’s ability to accurately perform a 
probability analysis. Rather, the problem is that the “highly 
circumstantial” nature of the record means that any probability 
assessment from that record—regardless of who is performing this 
probability analysis—will be impaired. The confidence problem 
thus requires a different “fix” than the probability problem. The 
probability problem is the jury’s accurateness is assessing 
probability; the fix is to shift probability decision making from the 
jury towards the judge. The confidence problem, however, is with 
the incomplete state of the record; the fix here is to prevent a 
probability analysis from even occurring. If the problem is the 
inadequate quantity of evidence in the record (confidence), shifting 
decision-making power from the jury to the judge does not address 
the problem. 
This concept can be deftly demonstrated by returning to the 
blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals. Recall that in each 
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hypothetical a purely probabilistic view seemed to compel a 
victory for the plaintiff; the statistical, circumstantial evidence 
indicated that the material fact in dispute had occurred. Figure D 




Notice that for each of these hypotheticals, the probability 
assessment will be exactly the same for either a jury at trial or a 
judge at summary judgment. A jury forced to give an assessment 
of probability from the record evidence would have to conclude 
that the material fact in dispute was 80% probable in the blue bus 
hypothetical and 50.1% probable in the gatecrasher hypothetical. A 
judge’s assessment of probability at summary judgment is different 
than a jury’s assessment of probability at trial; a judge is only to 
determine whether a jury could reasonably come to a probability 
conclusion for either side. This analysis has been depicted in this 
Article as a range or continuum of reasonable probability 
conclusions from the evidence. For the blue bus and gatecrasher 
hypotheticals, however, there is only one reasonable probability 
conclusion from the evidence: 80% in the blue bus hypothetical 
and 50.1% in the gatecrasher hypothetical. Thus, the range of 
reasonable probability conclusions for the judge at summary 
judgment shrinks to the exact same point estimate as the jury’s 
assessment of probability at trial. Indeed, that is the beauty of these 
hypotheticals: by removing any dispute as to the probability 
required from the record evidence, these hypotheticals show that 
another concept is at play. 
Consider, then, how shifting decision-making power from jury 
to judge is completely ineffective at resolving the “problem” if the 
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problem is the inadequate quantity of evidence. The blue bus and 
gatecrashers hypotheticals demonstrate that even if the probability 
determination is completely shifted from jury to judge, the judge 
will still get the “wrong” answer through a probability analysis. In 
the hypotheticals, the range of reasonable probability conclusions 
was nonexistent, meaning that the judge’s summary judgment 
conclusion pursuant to the reasonable jury standard would suggest 
an award of summary judgment for the plaintiff. Yet, a judge 
performing a probability analysis would reach the same “incorrect” 
result as a jury forced to make a probability conclusion at trial. 
Only by performing a confidence analysis can the judge reach the 
“right” result in the hypotheticals, which is to award summary 
judgment to the defendant. This confidence approach completely 
precludes a probability analysis from ever being performed, by 
judge or jury. 
Of course, characterizing Matsushita as deriving from 
probability or confidence principles is more difficult than 
characterizing the blue bus and gatecrashers hypotheticals as such. 
In the hypotheticals, a probability analysis means victory for the 
plaintiff; only a confidence analysis can explain a summary 
judgment for the defendant. In Matsushita, however, the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant could have been the 
result of either a probability analysis or a confidence analysis; 
unlike the hypotheticals, a precise and agreed-upon determination 
of the probability of the alleged conspiracy in Matsushita is simply 
not feasible. In attempting to make this determination regarding the 
true nature of the decision in Matsushita, however, it is helpful to 
remember that each analysis derives from a different problem: if 
the problem in Matsushita was jury decision making, the decision 
was based on a probability analysis. If the problem in Matsushita 
was the incomplete state of the record, the decision was based on a 
confidence analysis. 
 
2. Matsushita Involves a Legal Standard 
 
So, was confidence—rather than probability—the impetus for 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Matsushita? Earlier, I compared 
Matsushita to a Rubik’s Cube. Under a confidence understanding 
of the case, most of the sides of this Rubik’s Cube start to align 
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and the problems that arise under a probability view of the case 
subside. First, recall that the “No Chance!” probability reading of 
Matsushita could not account for the language in the opinion 
strongly suggesting that the issue before the Court involved the 
standard for summary judgment rather than its application to a 
particular summary judgment record.169 A confidence reading of 
Matsushita comports with the language in the opinion indicating 
that the issue before the Supreme Court was the “standard district 
courts must apply when deciding whether to grant summary 
judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case.”170 A confidence inquiry 
requires a judge to make a legal determination as to whether there 
is an acceptable amount of evidence to proceed to a probability 
analysis.  The nature of this analysis is explored in more depth in 
Probability, Confidence, and the Reasonable Jury Standard,171 
This analysis essentially requires judges to ask two policy 
questions: (1) of the universe of available evidence on the disputed 
question of material fact, how much exists in the current summary 
judgment record?; and (2) what are the potential negative 
consequences of allowing the case to proceed to a jury for a 
probability assessment from this record? If these are the questions 
that the Court was wrestling with in Matsushita, it makes sense 
that the Court would characterize this inquiry as a legal one 
involving the standard for summary judgment. This type of inquiry 
does not involve the probable truth of the plaintiff’s allegations. 
 
3. Antitrust Law and Eastman Kodak 
 
A confidence reading explains the Court’s emphasis on 
antitrust law when it determined that summary judgment was 
appropriate. Recall the various passages within Matsushita that 
emphasize the antitrust context of the case, such as the following: 
“[M]istaken inferences in [predatory pricing] cases such as this one 
are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the 
                                                
169 See supra subsection V(A)(1). 
170 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Radio Zenith Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 576 
(1986) (emphasis added). 
171 Meier, supra note 1. 
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antitrust laws are designed to protect.”172 This type of policy 
inquiry is fully consistent with—indeed, it is required by—a 
confidence analysis. 
A confidence analysis requires a judge to make a policy 
decision concerning the consequences of allowing a jury to make a 
probability assessment from the evidence. Commentators have 
offered a host of policy considerations that might inform this 
inquiry. For instance, Professor Charles Nesson posits that it is 
critical that the general public view jury trials as legitimate, and 
that allowing cases to proceed to a jury for a probability analysis, 
despite a meager record, might undermine the credibility of the 
entire system.173 Similarly, Professor Adrian A.S. Zuckerman 
submits that a judge must be concerned with protecting the 
integrity of the system and that allowing cases with a scant 
summary judgment record to proceed to trial might undermine the 
integrity of the system.174 Professor Zuckerman suggests that the 
public will reject civil verdicts in which the defendant is seemingly 
judged not on his or her individual actions but instead on 
belonging to a certain group (for example, owning blue busses) 
that statistically suggests that the defendant is liable.175 Professor 
Richard Lempert focuses on another component of the confidence 
inquiry, arguing that a judge should consider, as part of a 
                                                
172 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594. 
173 See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or The Events?  On Judicial Proof 
and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1379 (1985) (citing 
cases) (“Although the defendant probably caused the plaintiff’s injury, the 
factfinder cannot reach a conclusion that the public will accept as a statement 
about what happened.  .  .  . Because the judicial system strives to project an 
acceptable account about what happened, then, the plaintiff’s evidence is 
insufficient, notwithstanding the high probability of its accuracy.”). 
174 See Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law Fact or Justice?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 487, 
499 (1986) (stating that confidence in verdicts is “crucial to public respect for 
judicial adjudication”). 
175 See id. (“Judgments based on naked statistical distributions openly 
acknowledge that the individual defendant may well belong to the innocent 
minority, and therefore undermine the citizen’s confidence that the legal system 
will protect him from mistaken conviction of crime or mistaken imposition of 
liability.”). 
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confidence analysis, the incentive of plaintiffs176 to produce more 
specific evidence so as to survive summary judgment.177 
The policy concerns that these authors identify have universal 
application to every type of case, but there is no reason that policy 
concerns unique to a particular body of law might not also be 
considered. This is precisely what occurred in Matsushita when the 
Court stated that “mistaken inferences in [predatory pricing] cases 
such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the very 
conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”178 The 
Matsushita Court was concerned about the policy effect of 
allowing a jury to infer the existence of an illegal antitrust 
conspiracy solely from evidence that, absent an agreement, was not 
only legal but desirable.179 
The antitrust-specific concerns that drove the Court in 
Matsushita, however, were not present in the Court’s subsequent 
antitrust case of Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, 
Inc.,180 which explains why the Court reached a different 
conclusion regarding summary judgment in Kodak than in 
                                                
176 As I explain in Probability, Confidence, and the Reasonable Jury 
Standard, the party with the burden of persuasion at trial will be the party who 
suffers when a court concludes, pursuant to a confidence analysis, that the 
evidence is insufficient to survive summary judgment.  See Meier, supra note 1. 
177 See Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the 
Process of Proof, 66 B.U. L. REV. 439, 460 (1986) (discussing the incentive on 
plaintiffs to come forward with more evidence). 
178 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 
(1986). 
179 This policy concern does not depend on the probability that an 
agreement exists in a particular case.  Rather, the concern is that a market 
participant will recognize that a decision based only on circumstantial evidence 
involves a high margin of error and that, inevitably, mistakes in future cases—
including “false positive” results in which a conspiracy is incorrectly determined 
to exist—will preclude otherwise desirable market conduct.  See Mark Anderson 
& Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False Positive 
Error, 20 CORN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 21 (2010) (“Recognizing ex ante the 
danger of incurring discovery expenses and possible liability, defendants are 
motivated to keep well short of the line that separates legal from illegal conduct. 
In eschewing legal conduct that may give rise to litigation, defendants dumb-
down their conduct to their own, and society’s, detriment. That, too, is a cost of 
false positive error.”). 
180 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
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Matsushita. In Kodak, the Court considered the plaintiffs’ claim 
that Kodak had tied its business of servicing Kodak machines to 
Kodak’s business of selling parts for its machines.181  For Kodak to 
be liable on this claim, it must have had “appreciable economic 
power” or “market power” in the parts market.182 The Supreme 
Court treated the question of whether Kodak had market power in 
the parts market as a question of fact to be resolved by the jury.183 
Kodak argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because it 
did not have market power in the equipment market and thus could 
not have market power in the parts market.184  
The Kodak case thus bears a loose resemblance to Matsushita; 
in both cases the defendant argued that the circumstantial evidence 
in the summary judgment record compelled a decision—before 
trial—for the defendant. The Court noted, however, that the “false 
positive” concerns from Matsushita were not as acute in Kodak 
because the Kodak plaintiffs—unlike the Matsushita plaintiffs—
were not asking the jury to infer illegal behavior from conduct that 
was both legal and desirable.185 Thus, Kodak and Matsushita 
demonstrate that the policy concerns that inform the confidence 
inquiry will not necessarily be uniform across cases, even those 
involving the same general subject matter.186 
                                                
181 Id. at 454–55. 
182 Id. at 464. 
183 Id. at 469–79 (analyzing the question of market power as a factual 
issue); but see William W. Schwarzer, Making the Rule of Reason Analysis 
More Manageable, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 233, 234 (1988) (“[I]n many cases 
[determination of the relevant market] is susceptible to decision on summary 
judgment; it is not a jury question at all.”). 
184 Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464–66. 
185 Id. at 478 (“Nor are we persuaded by Kodak’s contention that it is 
entitled to a legal presumption on the lack of market power because, as in 
Matsushita, there is a significant risk of deterring procompetitive conduct.”). 
186 Interpreting Matsushita as having been decided according to a 
confidence analysis also provides context to the Kodak Court’s description of 
the Matsushita decision.  In Kodak, the Court said that “[t]he Court’s 
requirement in Matsushita that the plaintiffs’ claims make economic sense did 
not introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing summary judgment in 
antitrust cases.” Kodak, 504 U.S. at 468.  Linguistically speaking, this sentence 
is a nightmare, and it is difficult to determine precisely what the Court meant by 
this statement.  Some have interpreted this comment as requiring that the 
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4. The Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial 
 
A confidence reading also avoids the Seventh Amendment 
issues that plague the probability reading.  This concept is explored 
in greater depth in my Article “Probability, Confidence, and the 
Constitutionality of Summary Judgment.”187 To briefly summarize, 
while there are serious Seventh Amendment concerns in shifting 
the probability analysis away from the jury and toward the 
judge,188 the historical use of a confidence analysis as part of the 
involuntary nonsuit confirms that there is no constitutional 
problem when a judge determines that there is an inadequate 
amount of evidence from which to conduct a probability 
analysis.189 When this occurs, the judge has not addressed the 
probability of the material facts to the litigation but simply 
determined, as a matter of law, that no probability analysis will 
occur. There is a longstanding history of courts concluding that 
certain evidence is not sufficient—as a matter of policy rather than 
probability—to warrant submission to a jury for a probability 
determination.190  At the time the Seventh Amendment was 
adopted in 1791, English courts could enter an involuntary nonsuit 
against a plaintiff, before trial, when that plaintiff had failed to 
                                                
analysis of Matsushita be applied outside the antitrust context.  See, e.g., Duane, 
supra note 10, at 1569 n.174 (1995) (concluding that [Kodak] resolves that 
Matsushita is not limited to the antitrust context).  This interpretation is difficult 
to square with the antitrust-specific language in the opinion—at least if 
Matsushita was decided according to a probability analysis.  If, however, 
Matsushita was decided according to a confidence analysis, the Kodak Court’s 
characterization of Matsushita makes sense.  Matsushita was not decided 
according to an analysis that imposed a special burden in antitrust cases.  Rather, 
a confidence analysis is always part of a judge’s inquiry at the summary 
judgment stage, be it an antitrust case or another type of case.  This confidence 
analysis, however, can be informed by policy concerns that are unique to a 
particular subject matter. 
187 See generally Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the 
Constitutionality of Summary Judgment. (forthcoming) (concluding that no 
Seventh Amendment violation occurs when summary judgment is entered 
pursuant to a confidence analysis).  
188 See id. 
189 See id. 
190 See id.  
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assemble an adequate record from which the jury could reach a 
probability determination.191   
 
5. The Transsubstantive Nature of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 
 
A confidence reading of Matsushita also reconciles the case 
with the transsubstantive approach of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Recall that, under a probability reading of Matsushita, 
the Court’s emphasis on the antitrust setting of the case seems to 
run afoul of the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules.192 A 
confidence reading of Matsushita, however, explains how the 
Court could weigh antitrust-specific considerations yet stay true to 
the Federal Rules’ transubstantive approach.193 A confidence 
analysis requires a judge to ask the same question in every case: is 
there an adequate amount of evidence to allow this case to proceed 
to a jury for a probability determination?  
The application of this transsubstantive standard might require 
a judge to consider the particular substantive law involved in the 
case. Thus, in Matsushita, the Court considered the negative 
consequences of allowing an antitrust plaintiff to proceed to a jury 
probability determination based on circumstantial evidence of legal 
(and desirable) behavior that was also probative of illegal 
conduct.194 That a procedure rule might be applied differently for 
different types of cases, however, is fully consonant with the 
transsubstantive ideals of the Federal Rules. This is obvious when 
one considers the pleading standard of Rule 8. Obviously, a judge 
cannot know whether a plaintiff has pled a claim under Rule 8 
without considering the substantive law involved.195 Yet no one 
                                                
191 See id.  
192 See supra Subsection V(A)(2). 
193 Of course, this inquiry begs an additional question: Even if the 
Matsushita Court was, in reality, applying a confidence analysis to affirm the 
defendants’ summary judgment, does Rule 56 permit judges to engage in this 
type of inquiry? I plan to address this question in future scholarship. 
194 See supra notes 165–80. 
195 Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 162, at 830 (explaining that a judge 
determining whether a complaint complies with Rule 8 must determine whether 
“any legal claim exists that would be consistent” with the factual allegations of 
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would contend that Rule 8 is inconsistent with the transsubstantive 
nature of the Federal Rules.196 Simply put, the application of 
transsubstantive rules will often depend on the subject matter 
context of the case. Under a confidence reading of Matsushita, 
then, the Court’s consideration of antitrust-specific considerations 
was completely consistent with the transsubstantive approach 
contained in the Federal Rules. 
 
6. The Probability Language in Matsushita and 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. 
 
In light of the numerous advantages to a confidence reading of 
Matsushita, the final step is to determine whether this 
understanding of the case is consistent with the language of the 
opinion. As mentioned previously, there are concededly some 
portions of the Matsushita opinion that suggest that the Court was 
concerned with probability rather than confidence.197 The best 
reading of Matsushita, however, is that this probability language 
was actually dicta and that the plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient 
regardless of probability. 
The most direct language in this regard is found in a 
concluding footnote toward the end of the Court’s opinion. The 
footnote in question follows this textual sentence: “[i]n sum, in 
light of the absence of any rational motive to conspire, neither 
petitioners’ pricing practices, nor their conduct in the Japanese 
market, nor their agreements respecting prices and distribution in 
the American market, suffice to create a ‘genuine issue for 
trial.’”198 After this sentence, the Court states the following in a 
footnote: “We do not imply that, if petitioners had had a plausible 
reason to conspire, ambiguous conduct could suffice to create a 
triable issue of conspiracy. Our decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-
Rite Service Corp. establishes that conduct that is as consistent 
                                                
the complaint). 
196 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 909, 977 (1987) (describing the transsubstantive objectives behind 
Rule 8). 
197 See supra notes 114–22 and accompanying text. 
198 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597 
(1986). 
 PROBABILITY, CONFIDENCE, AND MATSUSHITA 131 
with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, 
without more, support even an inference of conspiracy.”199 This 
footnote is imperative to understanding the Court’s thought process 
in Matsushita.200 The footnote suggests that, despite the attention 
the Court gives to the probability issue (which the Court loosely 
characterizes as the “motive” question), the plaintiffs’ evidence did 
not meet the burden of production even if the conspiracy alleged by 
the plaintiffs was more straightforward and thus more believable. 
To understand this point, first consider the sentence in the text 
of the Court’s opinion preceding the footnote. The sentence in the 
text summarizes the circumstantial evidence available in the case. 
It lists the circumstantial evidence favoring the defendant,201 which 
the Court calls the “rationale motive” issue as a shorthand way to 
express the notion that the plaintiffs’ theory of predatory pricing 
involves a risky, long-term scheme attacking a well-established 
American company on its home turf.202 The Court then lists the 
circumstantial evidence relied on by the plaintiff: that the 
defendants have cooperated in other ways in both the Japanese and 
American markets, including agreements (that are not alone 
actionable) regarding prices in Japan and American.203 The textual 
sentence concludes that this list of evidence does not create a 
triable issue of fact under Rule 56.204 
The footnote following this sentence in the text, however, 
posits that even if the circumstantial evidence regarding the 
defendants’ “motives” was removed from the case, the plaintiffs’ 
evidence might still be insufficient to warrant submission to the 
jury. “Ambiguous conduct,” says the Court in the footnote, “does 
not, without more, support even an inference of conspiracy.”205 
                                                
199 Id. at 597 n.21. 
200 I am not alone in assigning significance to this footnote.  For extensive 
discussions the importance of footnote 21 of the Matsushita opinion, see Levin, 
supra note 105, at 1646–47; Randolph Sherman, The Matsushita Case: 
Tightened Concepts of Conspiracy and Predation, 8 CARD. L. REV. 1121, 1132–
33 (1987); David F. Shores, supra note 122, at 312–13.  
201 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597. 
202 See supra text accompanying notes 111–17. 
203 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 597 n.21. 
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The Court supports this conclusion with a citation to the Monsanto 
Co. decision.206 An inspection of the Monsanto decision reveals 
that the plaintiff’s evidence in that case was “ambiguous” in the 
exact same manner as the evidence involved in Matsushita, and 
that the summary judgment in Monsanto was clearly based on a 
confidence analysis. 
The Monsanto207 case dealt with essentially the same question 
raised in Matsushita: when does an antitrust plaintiff have 
sufficient evidence to meet her burden of production and get to the 
jury on the question of whether the defendant engaged in an illegal 
conspiracy?208 The Monsanto case implicated this question in the 
context of vertical price-fixing agreements (as opposed to the 
predatory pricing context involved in Matsushita).209 The plaintiff 
in the Monsanto litigation had been terminated in its capacity as a 
distributor of herbicide products manufactured by the defendants in 
that case.210 The defendants claimed that the termination occurred 
because the plaintiff failed “to hire trained salesmen and promote 
sales to dealers.”211 The plaintiff, however, argued that its 
termination was based on a failure to comply with a pricing 
scheme developed as part of an agreement between defendants and 
some of defendants’ other distributors.212 A manufacturer can 
independently establish a price that its distributors must comply 
with in order to remain a distributor,213 but it is a violation of 
antitrust law for this price to be established through an agreement 
between the manufacturer and (at least some) distributors.214 
                                                
206 Id. 
207 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
208 Compare id. at 755 (considering what standard of proof a plaintiff must 
meet in an antitrust vertical price-fixing conspiracy case), with Matsushita, 475 
U.S. at 576 (considering what standard of proof a plaintiff must meet in an 
antitrust conspiracy to price-fix case).  
209 Compare Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 755 (framing the conspiracy issue in 
the context of vertical price fixing), with Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584–585 
(framing the conspiracy issue in the context of predatory pricing). 
210 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 757. 
211 Id. at 752. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 760–61. 
214 Id. 
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In Monsanto, the district court concluded that a jury 
determination was necessary to resolve whether the plaintiff had 
been terminated as a distributor because of its failure to comply 
with a pricing scheme established through a conspiracy.215 The 
plaintiff’s evidence, as summarized by the Supreme Court in 
Monsanto, consisted of essentially two bits of evidence. First, 
according to the Court, there was “substantial direct evidence of 
agreements to maintain prices.”216 Second, there was 
circumstantial evidence that an agreement existed (and that the 
plaintiff had been fired for failing to comply with the terms of this 
agreement).217 This circumstantial evidence consisted of 
complaints filed by other distributors about the plaintiff’s low 
prices for the defendants’ products.218 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
decision of the district court in the Monsanto litigation, agreeing 
that the plaintiff’s burden of production had been satisfied and that 
a jury resolution was necessary.219 More specifically, the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence was 
alone sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of production and 
thus reach the jury.220 The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh 
Circuit on the question of whether the circumstantial evidence put 
forward by the plaintiff was, alone, sufficient to get the plaintiff to 
the jury.221 As the Court explained: 
[I]t is of considerable importance that independent 
action by the manufacturer . . . be distinguished 
from price-fixing agreement, since under present 
law the latter are subject to per se treatment and 
treble damages. On a claim of concerted price-
fixing, the antitrust plaintiff must present evidence 
sufficient to carry its burden of proving that there 
was such an agreement. If an inference of such an 
                                                
215 Id. at 758. 
216 Id. at 765. 
217 Id. at 767. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 758. 
220 Id. at 758–59.  
221 Id. at 759. 
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agreement may be drawn from highly ambiguous 
evidence, there is a considerable danger that the 
[distinction made in the law between independent 
action and illegal conspiracy] will be seriously 
eroded.222 
In this language from Monsanto, the Court is clearly 
articulating the policy reasons why circumstantial evidence might 
not be sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of production in an 
antitrust case. In short, there is significant danger in allowing a 
jury to find a defendant liable when the evidence produced 
involves a high margin of error and the consequences from an 
erroneous factual decision are serious. According to the Court in 
Monsanto, the problem with relying solely on circumstantial 
evidence in proving an antitrust conspiracy is not with the 
probative value of the evidence under a probability analysis:  
“We do not suggest that [the plaintiff’s 
circumstantial evidence] has no probative value at 
all, but only that the burden remains on the antitrust 
plaintiff to introduce additional evidence sufficient 
to support a finding of unlawful contract, 
combination, or conspiracy.”223  
Although the Court in Monsanto does not use the term 
“confidence” in its opinion, it is relatively clear that this concept of 
sufficiency of information guided the Court’s decision. According 
to the Monsanto Court, the problem with relying solely on 
circumstantial evidence to prove an antitrust conspiracy is not that 
a person would be unreasonable in concluding that the 
circumstantial evidence slightly favored a conclusion that a 
conspiracy exists. Instead, the problem is that the evidence is 
“highly ambiguous.”224 In other words, there is a high margin of 
error associated with the evidence—similar to a poorly conducted 
public opinion poll. And, because the consequences of an 
                                                
222 Id. at 763. 
223 Id. at 764 n.8 (emphasis added).  This requirement of producing 
additional evidence of an antitrust violation is sometimes referred to as the “plus 
factor” requirement.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, On the Meaning of Horizontal 
Agreements in Competition Law, 99 CAL. L. REV. 683, 749–52 (2011) 
(discussing ‘plus factors’). 
224 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763. 
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erroneous decision are severe, it is better that a probability analysis 
not be performed (by either the judge or the jury). 
The exact same can be said about the circumstantial evidence 
the plaintiffs relied on in Matsushita. The plaintiffs’ evidence 
demonstrated that an agreement among the defendants to price 
predatorily was a possible explanation for the defendants’ low 
prices. The plaintiffs’ evidence also showed that the defendants 
had worked together to coordinate business activities on different 
issues, including the establishment of price floors in Japan.225 In 
this regard, the evidence was “probative” in the same manner that 
the Monsanto evidence was probative. But, it was also 
“ambiguous” because neither case involved a “smoking gun” bit of 
evidence on the disputed, material fact. Thus, any conclusion 
drawn from the evidence (either that a conspiracy did, or did not, 
exist) would necessarily involve a high margin of error and little 
confidence that the probability assessment was accurate. 
In attempting to figure out the true basis of Matsushita, the 
Court’s multitude of references to Monsanto is telling.226 The 
Monsanto decision was clearly based on a confidence analysis 
rather than a probability analysis, and the Court in Monsanto did a 
relatively good job of articulating this somewhat elusive concept. 
The Matsushita opinion is, admittedly, not as clear or eloquent in 
describing the confidence concept as the true basis for summary 
judgment in that case. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that the 
difficult problem it was wrestling with in Matsushita was 
conceptually identical to the problem in Monsanto. 
The Matsushita Court’s difficulty in verbalizing the confidence 
concept is analogous to what occurred in Houchens, discussed 
above. In fact, in one passage within Matsushita, the Court falls 
back on language similar to the “equal inferences rule” that the 
Houchens court relied on: “[C]onduct that is as consistent with 
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, 
without more, support even an inference of conspiracy.”227 Earlier, 
in analyzing the Houchens case (which clearly involved an 
                                                
225 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596–
97 (1986). 
226 See id. at 588, 597–98. 
227 Id. at 597 n.21. 
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application of the confidence principle), I characterized the “equal 
inferences” language in that case as the product of a judge that 
intuitively understands the confidence concept but mangles the 
explanation of this tricky concept.228 The “equal inferences”-type 
language in Matsushita should be understood in the same manner. 
Because the probative value of the plaintiffs’ evidence of a 
conspiracy could legitimately be seen as unpersuasive, 
communicating the confidence concept in Matsushita was even 
more challenging. Recall that one of the benefits of the blue bus 
and gatecrasher hypotheticals is that these hypotheticals zero in 
(with pinpoint accuracy) on the paradox of a judge entering 
judgment against a plaintiff when the only available evidence 
suggests that the plaintiff’s version of the contested, material facts 
is most likely true.  
The Matsushita litigation (and most other real—as opposed to 
hypothetical—cases) does not replicate the same circumstances 
that made the paradox in the blue bus and gatecrasher 
hypotheticals so explicit. It is not clear in Matsushita, as it was in 
the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals, that a probability 
analysis based solely on the available record evidence would favor 
the plaintiffs. Rather, one could legitimately look at the record 
evidence in Matsushita and conclude that the enormous, and 
complicated, predatory pricing scheme asserted by the plaintiffs 
was unlikely. This factor complicated the elucidation of the 
confidence principle in Matsushita. Because the confidence issue 
was not as conspicuously thrust to the forefront as it was in the 
hypotheticals or even in Houchens, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the Court might struggle in expressing this tricky concept.229 There 
                                                
228 See supra Section IV.  
229 Part of the problem might inhere in the limitations of the English 
language.  See Vern R. Walker, Theories of Uncertainty: Explaining the 
Possible Sources of Error in Inferences, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1540 
(2001) (“The descriptive function of a theory of uncertainty is less obvious from 
the grammar of English.”).  As someone who has struggled to write clearly 
about the confidence concept using primarily the English language (rather than 
mathematical formulas), I would forcefully concur with Professor Walker’s 
assertion. Cf. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, LOGICO-TRACTATUS PHILOSPHICUS 5.6 
(“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.”).  In any event, I am 
not as critical as others about the mathematical limitations of most of within the 
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is a reason that the hypotheticals are thought to be a jurisprudential 
“paradox,” and that is because the answer to this paradox is not an 
easy one for lawyers (as opposed to mathematicians) to 
comprehend.   
Therefore, it is perhaps not completely surprising in a case 
such as Matsushita, where there is both a lack of record evidence 
on a material issue of fact and where a probability analysis of that 
record evidence could be viewed as favoring the defendant, that 
the Court would allow some probability language to creep into the 
opinion even though the true basis for the decision was a 
confidence analysis.   
 
7. Why Matsushita Helps Defendants and Hurts 
Plaintiffs 
 
There is a general consensus that the summary judgment 
standard applied by the Court in Matsushita helps defendants but 
not plaintiffs. This conclusion makes sense if Matsushita was 
decided according to a confidence analysis but not if Matsushita 
was decided according to a probability analysis. 
Under a probability reading of Matsushita, the allocation of 
authority with regard to disputed questions of fact was shifted from 
the jury to the judge. There is no reason, however, why this shift 
would help defendants at the expense of plaintiffs. Under a 
probability analysis, a judge determines whether a jury would be 
reasonable in resolving the disputed question of fact, and there is 
no logical reason as to why this standard cannot work for plaintiffs 
as well as against plaintiffs.230  This analysis is neutral between 
plaintiffs and defendants. If a jury would be unreasonable in 
                                                
legal profession.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE DECLINE OF LAW AS AN 
AUTONOMOUS DISCIPLINE: 1962–1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 778 (1987) 
(discussing the “prevalent (and disgraceful) math-block that afflicts the legal 
profession”).  Perhaps this is because I do not consider myself as exempt from 
the affliction that Judge Posner laments. Cf. Peter Tillers, Trial by 
Mathematics—Reconsidered, 10 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 167, 173 (2011) 
(“[T]he day may yet come when rigorous formal argument about evidence, 
factual inference and factual proof looks and feels warm and friendly to ordinary 
and mathematically illiterate people such as me.”).   
230 But see supra note 226. 
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resolving the facts either way, summary judgment is appropriate. 
Thus, if Matsushita was decided according to a probability 
analysis, the increased power of judges regarding the probability of 
disputed facts would theoretically result in an equal number of 
additional pre-verdict judgments for both the plaintiff and the 
defendant.231 
But this, of course, is not how Matsushita has been interpreted. 
Instead, Matsushita is viewed as a case that benefits defendants 
because it makes it more likely that a judge will grant a 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.232 This makes perfect 
sense if Matsushita was decided pursuant to a confidence analysis, 
because a confidence analysis always works against the party with 
the burden of production. A party with the burden of production 
has the burden of assembling an adequate amount of evidence at 
summary judgment; a confidence analysis determines whether this 
has occurred. Because a plaintiff has the burden of production on 
almost all issues,233 viewing Matsushita as being decided under a 
confidence analysis explains the conventional wisdom that 
Matsushita helps defendants at the expense of plaintiffs. 
                                                
231 There is a somewhat technical way to explain how Matsushita benefits 
defendants at the expense of plaintiffs, even if Matsushita was decided under a 
probability test.  Summary judgment is appropriate against the plaintiff if even 
one of the myriad facts that the plaintiff must prove in order to recovery is 
unreasonable.  On the other hand, summary judgment is appropriate against the 
defendant only if the jury would be unreasonable in finding for the defendant on 
every fact needed for the plaintiff.  The asymmetrical risks involved with 
increased judicial fact-finding could explain why the standard in Matsushita is 
perceived to help defendants at the expense of plaintiffs.  That said, this 
explanation seems less persuasive than the explanation offered in the text above, 
which is that Matsushita helps defendants because it was decided pursuant to a 
confidence analysis, which can only work against the party with the burden of 
production. 
232 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 47 (2005) (describing the “gatekeeping” aspect of the 
Matsushita decision); William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in 
Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 403 (2011) (“Matsushita expanded the 
ability of defendants to obtain summary judgment by inviting lower courts to 
scrutinize the economic plausibility of the plaintiff’s evidence of conspiracy.”) 
(emphasis added). 
233 See WRIGHT, supra note 52, at §5122 (explaining that the burden of 
production is usually on the plaintiff). 
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8. Twombly’s Plausibility Standard 
 
There is one final factor that supports the confidence 
understanding of Matsushita.  Understanding Matsushita through a 
confidence theory makes sense of the plausibility standard that the 
Court introduced in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly.234 Most 
commentators have rejected this “new” pleading standard under 
the mistaken premise that the plausibility analysis requires judges 
to determine the probability of disputed facts based only on the 
pleadings.235 However, once one views Matsushita through a 
confidence analysis, it is relatively easy to see the logic of the 
progression from Matsushita to Twombly: if the plaintiff alleges 
facts that, by themselves, are insufficient to satisfy the confidence 
analysis to which they will be subjected at the summary judgment 
stage, there is no reason to delay this legal conclusion past the 
pleadings stage. This concept is explored in more depth in my 
article Probability, Confidence, and Twombly’s Plausibility 
Standard, 236 but the relevancy to the current discussion is worth 
noting.  Once one interprets Matsushita under a confidence 
analysis, clarity arises, not just with regard to Matsushita and 
summary judgment but also with regard to the entire pre-trial 
process under the Federal Rules (including the plausibility analysis 




The best reading of Matsushita, considering the multitude of 
factors that one must considering in examining the case, is that it 
was decided under a confidence analysis. If these factors are 
analogized to a Rubik’s cube, a confidence reading of Matsushita 
aligns almost all the sides of the cube. 
A confidence reading of Matsushita cannot account for two 
sides of this Rubik’s cube. One is the language in the Matsushita 
opinion suggesting that the impetus for the Court’s decision was 
                                                
234 See 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
235 See supra notes 28–29. 
236  See Luke Meier, Comment, Probability, Confidence, and Twombly’s 
Plausibility Standard, SMU L. Rev. (forthcoming).  
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probability. As explained above, however, this language can be 
discounted as a byproduct of the difficulty associated with 
attempting to verbalize the elusive confidence concept. This task 
was made even more difficult in Matsushita by the probative 
weakness of the plaintiffs’ evidence.  Moreover, a careful reading 
of Matsushita and the Court’s previous decision in Monsanto Co. 
v. Spray-Rite Service Corp suggests that— even if the Court meant 
to speak in probability terms—it qualified this probability 
language, which would make it dicta. 
A confidence interpretation of Matsushita also cannot account 
for the broad, historical significance assigned to the case. The 
import of Matsushita, however, derives from the presumption that 
it was decided according to a probability analysis. This premise is 
incorrect.  As such, the conclusion that Matsushita dramatically 
reshaped summary judgment doctrine should be reconsidered.   
 
